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A tight fiscal stance can stop episodes of hyperinflation. But it
cannot, on its own, overcome the inertia of rising prices in
countries suffering chronic inflation. Such countries can never-
theless strengthen their stabilization efforts by anchoring nomi-
nal prices to the money supply or the exchange rate.
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I.  Introduction
Latin  American  countries  provide  the  best  living  laboratory  to  study
inflationary  processes  and  stabilization  programs. Chronic  inflation  is a
startling  feature  of the  region,  with  inflation  rates  ranging  from  low  to
moderate  in  countries  such  as Colombia,  Ecuador,  and  Venezuela,  to  high  and
accelerating  over  the  years  in  Argentina,  Brazil  and  Mexico,  culminating  in  an
exploding  hyperinflationary  process  more  recently  in Bolivia. Despite  the
large  number  of stabilization  programs  implemented  over  the  years  inflation
does  not  show  any  signs  of retreating.  If  anything,  in the  last  few  years  the
inflationary  process  has  all  but  accelerated  and  even  spread  to  countries  that
had  a tradition  of price  stability.
The  debt  crisis  started  a new  chapter  in the  history  of inflation.
In  a  very  short  span  we have  observed  an acceleration  of inflation  and  a large
variety  of stabilization  programs. Success  in fighting  inflation  has  at best
been  temporary,  and  in  most  cases  inflation  accelerated  once  the  stabilization
programs  were  abandoned. The  one  exception  is  Bolivia  where  the  orthodox
approach  of tight  monetary  and  fiscal  policies  has  so far  replicated  the
success  of the  1920s  in fighting  hyperinflation  in the  Central  European
countries. Stabilization  was  achieved  surprisingly  quickly  and  with
*  We are  grateful  to Bela  Balassa,  Eduardo  Borensztein,  Eli  Krets,  Maurice
Obstfeld,  Guy  Pfeffermann,  Marcelo  Selowsky,  Alan  Walters,  participants  at
the  LAC  seminar  in the  World  Bank  and  at the  meetings  of the  Asociacion
Argentina  de Economia  Politica,  for  helpful  comments  on  an earlier
draft. We  also  greatly  benefited  from  discussions  with  Edgardo
Barandiaran,  Guillermo  Calvo  and Sebastian  Edwards. Also  thanks  to Soo
Chul  Cho  and  Heidi  Zia  for  their  very  able  Research  Assistance.NL-2/2-1-88  - 2-
relatively  low  costs. The  Bolivian  experience,  however,  appears  in  many
respects  to  be an isolated  case.  In  most  other  instances  where  the  orthodox
policies  were  applied,  inflation  came  down  very  slowly,  and  the  stabilization
process  was  accompanied  by  a reduction  in  growth  and  increases  in
unemployment.
The  purpose  of this  paper  is to  analyze  the  experience  with orthodox
stabilization  policies  based  on the  results  of programs  implemented  in  various
Latin  American  countries, By  "orthodox"  we mean  policies  based  on  a tight
fiscal  stance  which  are  not  supported  by a system  of price  controls  (the
latter  play  an important  role  in  "heterodox"  policies  to  which  we shall  refer
very  briefly). We will  attempt  to elucidate  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of
the  orthodox  approach,  to  disentangle  the similarities  and  differences  among
various  programs  and  to extract  the  relevant  lessons  from  these  experiences.
Our focus  will  be  on a limited  number  of topics  that  are  central  to the
understanding  of disinflation  policies.
One  central  issue  are the  differences  between  chronic  inflation
(defined  as a long  period  of  moderately  high  inflation)  and  hyperinflation
regarding  the  dynamic  behavior  of prices  and  wages. These  are  particularly
relevant  to explain  the  reasons  that  make the  quick  disinflation  in Bolivia  a
unique  and  clearly  differentiated  case.  The  paper  also  tries  to shed  new
light  on the  relationship  between  budget  deficits  and  inflation. Is inflation
always  and  everywhere  in  Latin  America  a fiscal  phenomenon?  Do reductions  in
the  budget  deficit  always  result  in  lower  inflation  rates? Our  study  suggests
that  sound  fiscal  policy  is  a necessary,  though  no sufficient,  condition  for
price  stability,  sound  management  of  nominal  variables  (e.g.  the  exchange  rate
and/or  the  money  supply)  are  crucial  for  the  effectiveness  of the  program.NL-2/2-1-88  - 3 -
In chronic  inflation  countries  standard  orthodox  policies  do not
attain  reduntions  in inflation  that  are  comensurate  with  the  size  of the
adjustment.  The  external  circumstances  under  which  stabilization  programs  are
launched  and  tLe  existence  of inflation  inertia  are  two  important  reasons  for
this  result. We will  now  discuss  them  in  more  detail.
The  most serious  and  comprehensive  stabilization  programs  were
launched  at times  when  countries  were experiencing  high  inflation  as  well as
balance  of payments  problems. The  available  evidence  suggests  that  most  of
the  improvements  were in  the  external  front  while  little,  if  any,  gains  were
obtained  against  inflation. Since  the  external  constraint  tends  to  represent
a  more  pressing  concern  for  the  authorities,  tight  fiscal  polic;- ze usually
accompanied  by a large  devaluation  of the  exchange  rate,  which  eL..-.
pressures  on domestic  prices  and  in  most cases  also  destabilizes  the  long  term
rate  of inflation.  The  mechanism  by  which  a step  devaluation  can  lead  to a
permanent  increase  in  the  rate  of inflation  is  less  than  clear  and still
awaits  a thorough  explanation,  though  in this  paper  we advance  some  plausible
reasons  for  this  relationship.
Downward  rigidity  of inflation  in  chronic  inflation  has  been  a  major
concern  for  policy  makers. Over the  years  a growing  literature  has  developed
that  attempts  to  explain  the  existence  of inertia  or persistence  in  the  rate
of inflation. Backward  indexation  of wages,  discussed  among  others  in  Bacha
and  Lopez  (1983)  and  Arida  and  Lara  Resende  (1985),  is  perhaps  the  most  widely
accepted  one. According  to this  theory  backward  indexation  introduces  memory
into  the  system  making  sudden  reductions  in inflation  unlikely. The  existence
of staggered  contracts  even  if  they  have  forward  looking  elements,  is  a second
source  of inflation  rigidities.  This  will  clearly  be the  case  in  an economyNL-2/2-1-88  - 4 -
where  there  are  Taylor  type  contracts  in  which  nominal  wages  are  set  on the
basis  of present  and  expected  future  average  wages. The inertial  forces  are
present  in th':  framework  because  the  average  current  wage includes  wages  that
were set  in  past  periods. These  two  types  of inertia  are  tied  to the
"technology"  or institutional  arrangements  prevailing  in  the  economy. There
is  a tUiird,  and  probably  more important,  factor  that  can  cause  price  inertia:
credibility.  The  problems  created  by credibility  are  emphasized  in the  recent
works  by  Dornbuscr  and  Simonsen  (1986),  Simonsen  (1987),  and  Persson  and
van  Wijnbergen  (198,).
In countries  wn~-e  there  is  a long  history  of failure  of
stabilization  programs  agents  become  skeptical  about  the  success  of any  new
attempt. The  first  reaction  could  well  be one  of  wait  and  see  until  the  new
program  demonstrates  that  it  is serious  and  effective  in  dealing  with
inflation.  However,  to  the  extent  that  agents  have  the  power  to set  nominal
contracts  (wages  or  prices),  inflation  is likely  to  continue  at levels  that
are  close  to  the  ones  prevailing  prior  to  the  beginning  of the  stabilization
attempt  thus  undermining  the  success  of the  program.
Our  analysis  of orthodox  stabilization  policies  is structured  as
follows. In Part  I  we analyze  in detail  the  question  of  why  were  purely
orthodox  policies  especially  effective  in stopping  hyperinflations  (in
particular  the  Bolivian  one)  as opposed  to chronic  inflation  processes. We
put  special  emphasis  on the  elimination  of inertia  through  the  process  of
hyperinflation  which  explains  the  quick  reaction  of hyperinflation  to
stabilization  policies. We also  claim  that  the  identification  of the  cause
for  inflationary  acceleration  with the  erosion  of government  revenues  and  the
unsustainable  nature  of the  hyperinflationary  process  create  the  requiredNL-2/2-1-88  -5-
credibility  for  the  stabilization  policies  which  are  based  on a combination  of
a fiscal  adjastment  and  exchange  rate  pegging. We clain  that  the  foregoing
conditions  are  not  applicable  to chronic  inflation  countries.
In  Part  II  we turn  to  chronic  inflation  countries  and  analyze  three
basic  types  of stabillzation.  The  first  type  is based  almost  exclusively  on
the  fiscal  adjustment.  We point  out  analytically  the  major  weakness  of this
approach  (as  far  as inflation  is concerncd)--namely,  lack  of  nominal  anchors--
and  base  the  empirical  analysis  on the  experiences  of Brazil  and  Mexico  in the
1980s. Using  these  experiences  we try  to  explain  the  paradox  of the  joint
occurrence  of a sharp  cut  in  the  fiscal  deficit  and  an upsurge  in the
inflation  plateau.
We explain  the  paradox  by twa  considerations.  First,  inflation  can
be accommodated  by  central  bank  policy  in spite  of a substantial  fiscai
adjustment.  Secondly,  the  inflationary  policies  in the  aforementioned  Mexican
and  Brazilian  cases  were  motivated  by the  difficulties  in the  external  sector,
a scenario  which  we described  earlier. These  created  an incentive  to step  up
devaluations  and  inflation  to  a higher  plateau  in  order  to  erode  the  real  wage
in a  system  of (formal  or informal)  indexation.  Clearly  the  adherence  to
nominal  anchors  was  abandoned  as part  of  an effort  to  equilibrate  the  external
sector.
This  leads  us to  consider  programs  which  do employ  nominal  anchors
in conjunction  with  the  fiscal  adjustments.  In  this  category  we  consider
first  the  strategy  of  using  money  as the  nominal  anchor. We point  out the
difficulties  inherent  in this  approach  in  view  of inertial  forces  and
credibility  problems. We  base  the  empirical  analysis  on the  policies  employed
in Chile  and  Argentina  by the  military  regives  in the  mid  1970s. It  wasWL-2/2-1-88  -6  -
especially  the  monetary  crunch  in Chile  in 1974-75  which  involved  a  high
social  cost  in terms  of unemployment.
Finally,  we examine  the  exchange  rate  based  stabilizations  which
often  evolve  out  of the  monete-y-1hscal  package  described  earlier. We analyze
the  relationship  between  excLaL'  s  rate  and fiscal  policies  in the  short  and
long  run,  highlighting  the  role  of credibility  issues. The  empirical  analysis
is  based  on four  stabilizations  carried  out  by Argentina  in the  past  thirty
years  as well  as on the  experiences  of Chile  and  Uruguay  around  the  end  of the
1970s.
While  in  the  case  of Argentina  the  main  cause  for  the  eventual
failure  of these  policies  was lack  of persistence  in  fiscal  disciplnie,  this
was  not  the  case  in Chile. The  source  of the  difficulties  in the  latter  case
seems  to  be related  to inertial  forces  based  in part  on backward  indexation,
as  well  as on other  institutional  downward  rigidities  in the  real  wage.  This
was  exacerbated  by an  unduly  long  insistence  on  maintaining  a fixed  exchange
rate  in spite  of lack  of credibility  in the  ability  of the  domestic  price
mechanisms  to  correct  the  overvaluation  without  recourse  to  a major
devaluation.
In the  final  part  of the  paper  we consider  the  long  run  view  which
extends  beyond  specific  programs  and  emphasizes  the  importance  of  persistence
in  fiscal  discipline  and  in  adherence  to  nominal  anchors. We conclude  with
some  remarks  on thc  potential  usefulness  of the  "heterodox"  alternative.IL-2/2-1-88  - 7 -
II.  Stopping  Chronic  Inflation  and  Hyperinflation
1.  Stopping  Hyperinflations  The  Case  of Bolivia
During  the  sixties  and  seventies  Bolivia  had  moderate  inflation
rates  by Latin  American  standards.  The  worse  inflationary  episodes  occurred
in the  mid-fifties  when the  annual  inflation  rate  remained  above  100  percent
for  a  number  of years. This  period  was  characterized  by political  instability,
fiscal  deficits  and  by inflationary  pressures  which  were suppressed  by the
severe  price  controls  which  were  later  eliminated  in the  successful
stabilization  of late  1956  (Eder  1968). Since  the  late  1950s  inflation  has
been  fairly  low,  noting  that  the  country  vas  on a  fixed  exchange  rate  regime
(with  only  two  devaluations  till  1982). In recent  years,  however,  there  was  a
drastic  acceleration  in  price  increases  and  Bolivia  had the  dubious  honor  of
joining  the  selected  group  of countries  that  underwent  hyperinflation.
There  seems  to  be some  agreement  that  the  hyperinflationary
developments  were  triggered  by  a sharp  reduction  of external  funds  which  at
the  time  were  used  to finance  the  budget  deficit  (see  Sachs  (1986)  and  Morales
(1987a)). During  most  of the  seventies  and  early  eighties  Bolivia  received
positive  external  net  resource  transfers  since  net  new  lending  exceeded  net
interest  payments. The situation  took  a  drastic  turn  in 1982  and  by 1983  net
external  resource  transfers,  which  had  already  turned  negative  in 1982,
reached  -5.6  percent  of  GDP.  Indeed,  1982  signs  the  beginning  of the
relentless  acceleration  in  inflation. Since  then,  deficits  had  to  be financed
through  domestic  resources. Seigniorage,  which  during  most  of the  seventies
remained  at 2 percent  of CDP,  all  of  a sudden  jumped  to 12Z  of  GDP  and it
remained  around  those  levels  until  the  end  of the  hyperinflation.  The
increases  in  the  money  supply  in  turn  fed  on inflation  which  in  August  1985I..-2/2-l-88  -8 -
reached  an annualized  level  of over  45,000  percent.-1 The  continuous
acceleration  in  inflation  eroded  government  revenues,  which  by 1985  were  a
meager  1.3  percent  of GDP. The  fiscal  accounts  were in  disarray  and the
budget  deficit  mounted  to 20 percent  of GDP. By that  time  the  situation  was
not sustainable  (see  Morales  (1987a])  as there  was  no stationary  rate  of
inflation  that  could  finance  the  large  injections  of money. In the  absence  of
any  drastic  measures  the  prospects  were  for  inflation  to  increase  on an
explosive  path.
The  general  deterioration  in  the  economy  prompted  early  elections,
and  Paz  Estensioro  took  power  in  August  1985. On August  29 a successful
stabilization  program  was launched  along  strictly  orthodox  lines,  which
stopped  inflation  right  on its  tracks. The  Bolivian  program  was  based  on  a
sharp  cut  in the  budget  deficit  (from  over  202  in 1983  and 1984  3-42  in 1986,
see  Table  1),  on  monetary  discipline  and  on exchange  rate  stabilization  [see
Sachs  (1986)  and  Morales  (1987b)J. The  abrupt  stopping  of inflation  did  not
have  a clear  impact  on output;  although  chere  was  a reduction  in economic
growth  and  an increase  in  unemployment,  this  could  be  attributed  to the
deterioration  of the  general  conditions  during  the  hyperinflation  years  and  to
the  drastic  deterioration  in the  terms  of trade  in  October  1985. The  drastic
1/  Kharas  and  Pinto  provide  a slightly  different  interpretation  of the
development  of  hyperinflation  in Bolivia. While  recognizing  that  fiscal
deficits  were  an important  element  in the  inflationary  process,  they
consider  that  the  main  caase  for  the  increases  in inflation  was  "a policy
rule  to  devalue  the  official  nominal  exchange  rate  according  to  movements
in  the  black  market"  (p.l).UL-2/2-1-88  -9-
reduction  in inflation  with  relatively  small  costsY!  followed  the  pattern  of
the  classical  European  hyperinflationa,  as  documented  in  numerous  studies  [see
e.g.  Sargent  (1986)).
The success  of this  program  stands  in sharp  oppomition  to  the  mixed
results  obtained  by orthodox  programs  in the  so-called  "chronic  inflation"
countries. Stopping  inflation  in  these  countries  is  usually  full  of obstacles
and strict  fizcal  discipline  has  not been  a sufficient  condition  to ensure
success. In  order  to deal  with  this  fundamental  problem  we will  first
consider  the  reasons  for  Bolivia's  success  in  bringing  about  an abrupt  stqp  to
inflation  and  examine  whether  there  are  underlying  structural  differences  in
the  price  mechanism  between  hyperinflation  and  chronic  inflation  thus
requiring  different  stabilization  strategies.
2.  Credibility  and  Stabilization
In  explaining  the  difficulties  encountered  by stabilization  programs
in  Latin  America  great  stress  is  put  on the  credibility  of the  policies. Did
the  Bolivian  program  enjoy  greater  credibility? Sachs  (1986)  argues
convincingly  that  the  program  did  not seem  very  credible  from  the  point  of
view  of sustainability  in  the  light  of the  shaky  political  setting. He
claims,  however,  that  long  run  credibility  [of  the  type  required  by Sargent
(1986)]  is  not  necessary  for  short  run  stabilization  as long  as the  exchange
rate  is stabilized.
l/  The  costs  may perhaps  have  been  larger  than  those  suggested  by the  data  on
unemployment  and  growth  in table  1. The  cuts  in  government  expenditure
had  a significant  effect  on government  provided  social  services  and  public
investment,  which  could  affect  growth  in  the  future. For  a discussion  of
this  aspect,  see  Morales  (1987.b).WL-2/2-1-88  - 10  -
rhis  thesis  is quite  obvious  for  an economy  based  only  on
tradeables,  given  the  law  of  one price. Inflation  can  then  be stopped
immediately  by fixing  the  exchange  rate  and  the  short-run  sustainability  will
be supported  by the  increase  in international  reserves  resulting  from  the
increase  in the  demand  for  money.  If the  budget  is  balanced  then  the
situation  is tustainable  in the  longer  run.  If  not, then  it will  be
sustainable  till  reserves  fall  to the  point  which  triggers  a balance  of
payment  crisis  &'la  Krugman  (1979)  (if  the  policy  is  not  reversed  before
that).
The  possibility  of stopping  hyperinflation  by exchange  rate
stabilization,  even  if it  is temporary,  can  be  extended  to a  model  which
includes  nontradeables  and  is based  on agents  with  a long  forward  looking
view.  It is  however  essential  that  the  system  should  be free  of inertial
forces. This  condition  may be reasonably  well satisfied  in  advanced  stages  of
the  hyperinflationary  process,  as we shall  explain  later.
This  idea  can  be illustrated  by a simple  example  from  a recent  study
[Drazen  and  Helpman  (1986)]  which  uses  a Sidrauski  type  model  with  separable
utility  for  money  and  goods,  where  the  latter  include  both  traded  and
nontraded  categories.  The  equilibrium  conditions  includel/  the  followingt
c(t)  y  _
I/  Other  conditions  include  the  transversality  conditions  for  bonds  and  the
condition  for  optimal  money  holdings. The  transversality  conditions  imply
that  the  government  is solvent  but  this  does  not  rule  out  the  possibility
of inflationary  finance.kL-2/2-1-88  - 11  -
Q1[C(t),  Yn - inl  n  0
S[c(t)  - -in)  E
where  cn,  gn  and  yn  are  private  and  government  consumption  of  non-traded  goods
and  Yn  is  the  endowment  of  these  goods.  ul  is  the  marginal  utility  of  traded
goods  (c). Pn  is  the  nominal  price  of  non-traded  goods  and  e is  the  nominal
exchange  rate  (the  world  price  tradeables  is  constant).  0  is  the  marginal
utility  of  wealth  and  S  is  the  marginal  rate  of  substitution  between  cn  and  c.
Since  0  is  constant  over  time  along  the  optimal  path  c  must  be
constant  over  time  (t)  if  gn  is  constant  (a  constant  value  is  denoted  by  a
bar). It  therefore  follows  that  the  real  exchange  rate  - is  constant  and  so
Pn
Pn  must  be  constant  when  E  is  constant.  This  does  not  depend  on  the  current
state  of  the  budget  deficit.  Even  if  it  is  known  with  certainty  that  in  the
future  the  government  will  raise  the  rate  of  devaluation,  prices  will  remain
stabilized  nominally  till  that  date.
The  issue  of  credibility  in  the  long-run  consistency  of  fiscal
policies  with  the  fixed  exchange  rate  arises  in  a  world  of  uncertainty  and  has
some  implications  for  the  stabilization  policy.  In  particular  a  low  degree  of
fiscal  credibility  will  limit  the  foreign  borrowing  potential  of  the  central
bank. This  in  turn  will  place  constraints  on  the  government's  ability  to  run
deficits.  Specifically,  suppose  that  following  the  stabilization  of  the
exchange  rate,  the  government  is  still  running  a  deficit  and  losing
resetves.  Then  a  balance  of  payments  crisis  may  emerge  even  if  the  government
plans  to  offset  the  current  deficits  by  future  surpluses  (this  issue  will  beNL-2/2-1-88  - 12  -
discussed  further  in  Section  4, Part  II). These  considerations  may  explain
why  a combination  of both  current  fiscal  adjustment  and  pegging  of the
exchange  rate  are  usually  employed  in stopping  hyperinflation.
When inertia  due  to staggered  contracts  is  not  eliminated  (as  is the
case  of chronic  inflation  countries)  domestic  prices  (influenced  by non-
t:adeables)  will continue  rising  because  of the  influence  of past  contracts.
Lack  of credibility  in the  sustainability  of stabilization  policies  will  be
reflected  in  current  contracts  causing  an additional  downward  rigidity  in
inflation  and  a real  appreciation.
While  Sach's  thesis  seems  quite  convincing  to us we should  mention
that  most  analysts  of the  Bolivian  experiment  tend  to  attribute  to the  fiscal
adjustment  not  only  longer  run  stabilization  but  also  the  short  run  success.
In  their  view  the  exchange  rate  had  a secondary  role--essentially  an
endogenous  outcome  of fiscal  stabilization.  It is interesting  to  note that  a
similar  debate  regarding  the  roles  of fiscal  and  exchange  rate  policies  for
stopping  hyperinflation  has  arisen  in  connection  with  the  German
hyperinflation  of the  1920s  (Dornbusch  (1987)].
The  fiscal  interpretation  has to  explain  how  the  credibility  issue
is resolved  with the  announcement  of the  stabilization  program. Specifially,
if the  exchange  rate  stabilization  is  not  binding  then  one  needs  credibility
in the  government's  determination  to stop  monetary  accommodation  to
inflation.  In the  absence  of this  credibility  wage  and  price  setters  will
continue  the  inflationary  trend  expecting  the  central  bank  to  accommodate.
This  may  force  the  government  to  give in  and  accommodate  these  expectations.
How  is it  then  that  the  fiscal  adjustment  was sufficient  to  generate  the
required  credibility  and  put  an immediate  stop  to inflation?NL-2/2-1-88  - 13  -
This  may  be explained  by several  considerations.  In hyper-
inflationary  economies  the  cause  of the  process  is  very  clearly  identified
with  printing  money  to finance  the  budget  deficit  since  most  of the  tax  base
is  eroded  by inflation. Therefore  elimination  of the  central  bank's  finance
of the  budget  deficit  is  viewed  as a removal  of the  cause  of inflation.  This
consideration  is reinforced  by the  fact  that  after  some  point  inflation  and
printing  of  money  can  be used  only  for  one  purpose--the  fiscal  one  (it  is  not
possible  to change  real  assets  or relative  prices  by stepping  up inflation  or
devaluation  even  more).
Another  consideration  which  makes  the  fiscal  solution  stick  is that
after  some  point,  hyperinflation  is  not  sustainable  even  in the  short  run.
Therefore  any  solution  which  is feasible  (even  in the  short  run)  tends  to be
accepted  as workable  and  credible.!'
We must  finally  mention  the  fact  that  Bolivia,  like  other  countries
which  experienced  a hyperinflationary  process,  is not  normally  a high
inflation  country. The  hyperinflationary  process  is  considered  as an isolated
episode  which  is  not  characteristic  of normal  times. Therefore  stability  is
more  credible.
3.  Elimination  of Inertia  Through  Hyperinflation
One  of the  main  reasons  which  is often  advanced  to explain  the
comparative  easiness  of stopping  hyperinflation,  in  contrast  to chronic
inflations,  is  the  eradication  of inflationary  inertia  by the  very  process  of
1/  Some  support  for  this  consideration  is suggested  by the  fact  that  Bolivia
did  not  eliminate  fully  the  budget  deficit  (which  remained  at  a faily  high
level  of 3-4X  of  GDP);  but  it  did  stop  financing  the  deficit  by printing
money. Thus  it  was the  feasibility  of the  short  run  solution  which  was
sufficient  to attain  stability.NL-2/2-1-88  - 14  -
hyperinflation  [Pazos  (1972)]. In  moderate  to low  inflation  economies  there
are  explicit  or implicit  staggered  nominal  contracts  which  tend  to increase
the uemory  of the  system. The longer  the  duration  of the  nominal  contracts
the  larger  the  amount  of persistence  that  prices  are likely  to portray  (Taylor
1979). As inflation  increases,  the  duration  of nominal  contracts  starts  to
shrink  (Pazo.  1972),  and  they  become  almost  entirely  synchronized  during
hyperinflations.  Thus,  hyperinflation,  to  a  large  extent,  resembles  a system
of fully  flexible  prices  and  wages  with  no nominal  rigiditiest  with the
potential  of responding  very  quickly  to disinflationary  measures. Inflation
becomes  a balloon  which  can  be pulled  down  very  rapidly.
An additional  factor  that  helped  the  elimination  of price  inertia
was  the  synchronization  of prices  that  resulted  from  what  is sometimes  termed
dollarization  of the  economy. Pari  pasu  with the  increases  in the  rate  of
inflation  the  US dollar  started  to  play  a  greater  role  as the  unit  of
account. A larger  number  of prices  were  quoted  in  dollars,  although  the
domestic  currency  continued  to  be used  as a means  of payments. The
dollarization  amounted  to an elimination  of fixed  nominal  contracts,  in fact,
prices  were  "indexed"  daily  to the  dollar,  whose  value  was freely  determined
in  the  parallel  foreign  exchange  market. Dollarization  has  at least  two
potential  advantages  for  rapid  disinflation.  First,  it  contributes  to a
greater  synchronization  of price  decisions  thus  avoiding  the  distortions  in
relative  prices  that  results  from  staggered  nominal  contracts. Second,  it
provides  the  authorities  a natural  and  market-wide  observed  nominal  variable
that  can  be  used  as a  nominal  anchor  in  a disinflation.  Stabilizing  the  value
of the  dollar  amounts  to  stability  in  domestic  prices.N1-2/2-1-88  - 15  -
The  quick  response  of inflation  to the  policy  measures  of September
1985  is  apparent  from  Table  2.  The  free  market  exchange  rate  appreciated
im_ediately  after  the  introduction  of the  stabilization  package,  while  prices
stabilized  just  one  week  later.!/ The  speed  of the  adjustment  Is similar  to
the  one  observed  in the  European  hyperinflations  of the  1920s. This
responsiveness,  however,  worked  In the  opposite  direction  as  well.  For
example,  the  r' axation  of fiscal  control  in December  1985  and  early  1986,  and
other  developments,  caused  a rapid  upsurge  in inflation  bringing  it back  close
to the  hyperinflation  levels. Exchange  rate  stabilization  and  tight  fiscal
control  reestablished  price  stability  almost  immediately  (see  Table  3).  As we
shall  see,  one  does  not  find  rapid  reaction  of Inflation  to  equivalent  policy
measures  in  other  orthodox  stabilizations  In  Latin  America.
4.  Stabilization,  Inertia  and  External  Shocks
Another  basic  implication  of the  rational  inertialess  modeL2/  is
that  stabilizatLon  of LnflatLon  ls  Ludependent  of required  adjustments  in
relative  prlces  that  could  result,  for  exaple, from  external  shocks. Thus,
If the  system  is  subjected  to  an unexpected  deterioration  ln  the  terms  of
trade  then  thls  will  only  cause  a temporary  level-shock  to  prices  or
inflatlon.  However,  the  flrst  order  optLiality  conditions  still  imply  that
lnflatLon  will  be  stablizted  ln the  short  run  if the  exchange  rate  is
stabllized  and that  lt  will  be stabilized  ln  the  long  run  as  well  if the
budget  is  not fLnanced  by the  inflation  tax.
1/  The  lag  ln  the  response  of prices  was  partly  due to  the  elimination  of
repressed  LiflatLon,  the  devaluation  of the  official  exchange  rate  and
statlstlcal  problems  (Moraler  1987b).
2  By  this  we  refer  to  the  Sidrauski  type  model  discussed  ln  sectlon  2.NL-2/2-1-88  - 16  -
This implication  seems  to be borne  out  in  a striking  manner  in the
Bolivian  experiment  where  the  collapse  of the  tin  market  in  October  1985  put  a
most severe  strain  on the  stabilization  program  (see  Morales  (1987b)]. This
was  followed  by a massive  devaluation  of the  peso  in  November. In the  next
month  there  was  an acceleration  in inflation  and  a further  increase  in  the
budget  deficit. By January  inflation  was  once  again  above  30 percent  (Table
3).  However,  as noted  earlier,  with  the  full  stabilization-l  of the  exchange
rate  and  the  budgetary  measures  taken  on January  18,  1986  inflation  was
brought  again  unider  complete  control. This  aspect  of the  rational  model  is of
great  significance  for  our  later  comparisons  between  Bolivian  and  other
stabilizations  where  supply  shocks  did  slow  down  the  reaction  to
disinflationary  policies.
S.  The  Ability  to  Prevent  Hyperinflation
In  view  of the  argument  of Seetion  3  one  may  speculate  whether  a
hyperinflation  would  not  be  beneficial  for  chronic  inflation  countries  as a
means  of  overcoming  inflationary  inertia. This is  a purely  hypothetical
question  since  for  the  government  hyperinflation  may  mean  political  ruin,
while  this  event  is  not  inescapable.  The  fact  is  that  chronic  inflation
countries  have  developed  comprehensive  mechanisms  to live  with  inflation  which
are  based  on formal  and  informal  indexation  and  on discretionary  adjustments
in  private  and  public  accounts. Up to the  present  stage  in the  inflationary
process,  these  mechanisms  prevented  slippage  into  hyperinflation.
/  In the  early  stage  of stabilization  the  government  did  not  actually  peg
the  exchange  rate  but  rather  prevented  it  from  appreciating.  However,
Sachs  argues  that  this  amounts  to effective  pegging  given  the  pressure
towards  appreciation  as households  rebuilt  their  real  money  balances.NL-2/2-1-88  - 17  -
This  feature  of  chronic  Inflation  countries  is beat  reflected  by  the
behavior  of government  revenues  during  inflationary  accelerations.  We have
noted  that  a well  known  feature  of hyperinflationary  processes  is that  the
revenue  base  is eroded  by inflation  (the  Olivera-Tansi  effect)  thus
exacerbating  inflationary  acceleration  (see  Table  4  for  European
hyperinflations).  Bolivia  seems  to  have  followed  this  pattern  in the  1980s
while  chronic  inflation  countries  have  not.  It  can  be seen  in Table  4  that  as
inflation  began  to  accelerate  in Bolivia,  revenues  (as  percent  GDP)  dropped
from  9.51  x  1.3%. Note  also  that  this  percentage  was  2.6Z  in 1983  when  the
economy  was  not  yet  in  a full  hyperinflationary  state,  the  annual  rate  of
inflation  being  276Z.
This  contrasts  sharply  with the  chronic  inflation  countries  which
also  experienced  a sharp  acceleration  of Inflation  following  the  external
shocks  of the  late  1970s  and  the  debt  crises  of the  1980s. Thus,  in Argentina
inflation  rose  from  around  100%  In 1981  to  around  600Z  in 1984,  while  public
sector  revenues  dropped  only  temporarily  in 1982  and  1983  (only  by about  3%  of
GDP)  and  were  restored  in 1984. Similar  robustness  of revenues  can  be  seen  in
Brasil  (Table  4)  as well  as in  other  chronic  inflation  countries. It  seems
therefore  that  the  latter  countries  have  developed  adjustable  revenue
structures  which  enabled  them  up  to  this  stage,  to  diminish  the  risk  of
hyperinflationary  developments.
The  ability  to  prevent  hyperinflation  is  also  related  to the  size
and  sophistication  of the  financial  markets. When  the  government  can  finance
its  deficit  through  bonds,  temporary  increases  in the  budget  deficit  do  not
necessarily  result  in  Increases  In the  money  supply. As  a side  comment,  one
should  add  that  in  chronic  inflation  countries  these  bonds  are  usually  IndexedNL-2/2-1-88  - 18  -
or adjustable  rate  obligations  which  yield  (at  least  ex-ante)  a positive
return. On the  other  hand,  in  the  absence  of such  instruments  a temporary
deficit  may  lend  to  hyperinflation  when foreign  finance  is  not  available.l/
Thus,  if the  increase  in  government  total  deficit  (domestic  plus  foreign)
leads  to excessive  finance  by seigniorage  then  the  economy  may land  on a
hyperinflationary  trajectory.
These  considerations  are  represented  by Figure  1.  In panel  la  D and
D' represent  the  government's  budget  equation  for  a  given  deficit  under  steady
state  conditions. If this  curve  intersects  the  demand  curve  for  money  (md)  at
A then  we have  an equilibrium  with  a constant  level  of inflation. However,  if
D is  above  md there  is  no steady  state  solution  and  the  economy  must embark  on
a  hyperinflationary  process.
This  last  point  is  illustrated  in  Figure  lb in  the  space  (m,m)  which
represents  real  money  balances  and  their  rate  of change. The  underlying  model
is  presented  in  Kiguel  (1986). Each  trajectory  corresponds  to a given  level
of real  seigniorage.  In  a normal  situation  the  economy  is in  a stable
equilibrium  at point  A.  As the  constant  seigniorage  increases  the  TT schedule
shifts  down. However,  once  seigniorage  becomes  excessive,  there  is  no
stationary  rate  of inflation  that  can  be used  to  finance  the  deficit  and  the
economy  will  be  on TIT,  which  represents  a  hyperinflationary  motion. This
type  of  development  is  consistent  with  the  data  on inflationary  acceleration
in  Table  1.
1/ This  argument  about  the  role  of indexed  bonds  should  be  qualified  in  view
of the  possibility  that  the  very  introduction  of the  latter  bonds  may
reduce  the  demand  for  money. This  implies  a shrinkage  of the  base  of the
inflation  tax  and  therefore  more inflation  (if  the  elasticity  of the
demand  for  money  is  less  than  unitary). However,  if  close  substitutes  for
indexed  instrument  were  already  in  use then  the  addition  of indexed  bonds
may  not  affect  the  demand  for  money  appreciably.UL-2/2-1-88  - 19  -
This  interpretation  of the  Bolivian  hyperinflation  stands  in
contrast  with that  of Sachs  (1986)  Kharas  and  Pinto  (1987)  and  Krause
(1987). Although  these  authors  explain  the  higher  inflation  rates  as
resulting  from  higher  seigniorage  levels,  they  view  the  acceleration  of
inflation  as just  a transitory  phase  in the  way to a  new  higher  stationary
inflation  level  (Sachs,  ibid.,  pp.  12-13;  Kharas  and  Pinto  (1987),
Abstract]. In terms  of figure  lA,  this  would  correspond  to  a movement  from  A
to  A' where  as a result  of larger  seigniorage  the  economy  eventually  reaches  a
new  long  run  stable  equilibrium.
It is interesting  to  note that  3achs  reports  seigniorage  levels  of
around  12X  for  Bolivia  from  1982  through  1985  (prior  to stabilization)  which
is clearly  in excess  of a sustainable  level  (see  also  Table  5).  On the  other
hand,  chronic  inflation  countries  may  develop  large  deficits  which  are
financed  temporarily  in  a non-monetized  manner.
Perhaps  the  most  dramatic  example  of the  latter  possibility  is  the
finance  of Israel's  huge  budget  deficits  (over  20Z  of GDP)  following  1973.  In
the  1970.  only  about  one-tenth  of the  deficit  (amounting  to  around  2X of  GDP)
was  financed  by seigniorage  [Liviatan  and  Piterman  (1986)]. It can  also  be
seen  in  Table  4 that  with  the  acceleration  of inflation  in  Brazil  in the  early
1980s  and  with the  large  budget  deficits  in 1982  (Table  5) there  was  no
increase  in the  level  of seigniorage.l/
1/ Argentina  seems  to be  an intermediate  case  where  the  level  of seigniorage
(Table  5),  which  accompanied  inflationary  acceleration  in 1982-84,  was
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The  ability  of the  chronic  inflation  countries  to prevent
hyperinflationary  developmentsl  is  one  of the  reasons  for  their  inability  to
provide  a full  cure  for  inflation. It seems  that  these  countries  are  trapped
in  an odd  equilibrium  --  being  too  strong  to  permit  a hyperinflationary
deterioration  and  too  weak  to bring  their  fiscal  and  monetary  policies  under
appropriate  control.
6.  The  Consequences  of  Limited  Control  Over  Inflation
In what  way  does  the  ability  to prevent  hyperinflation  contribute  to
inflationary  rigidities  which  impede  stabilization  efforts? First,  in  a  non-
hyperinflationary  situation  inflationary  inertia  due  to staggered  contracts  is
still  significant.  As a  result,  stabilization  proceeds  slowly  and  is strongly
influenced  by lack  of credibility  (as  a result  of past  history).
Secondly,  since  hyperinflation  is  not  imminent  the  public  realizes
that  the  need to  reduce  inflation  is  not  inescapable  (at  least  in the  short
run). This reduces  the  public's  conviction  that  the  government  will  fight  for
stopping  inflation. This  factor  introduces  another  element  of rigidity  in  the
public's  inflationary  expectations.  Thirdly,  as noted  earlier,  in  a
hyperinflationary  situation  the  causes  of inflation  are  directly  associated  in
people's  minds  with  the  budget  deficit  and  with  excessive  seigniorage.  It is
for  this  reason  that  the  cure  is  also  clear,  namely  a policy  which  prevents
the  central  bank  from  printing  money  to finance  the  deficit. The  situation  is
entirely  different  with  a high  inflation  which  does  not  reach  the
hyperinflationary  stage.
I/  It is  conceivable  that  in the  future  new  types  of  hyperinflationary
processes  will  develop  to  which  these  countries  are  not  immune.UL-2/2-1-88  - 21  -
In the  latter  case  the  cause  for  a recent  increase  in  inflation  may
be quite  ambiguous. It could  be linked  to the  management  of nominal
variables,  to  accommodation  of  nominal  shocks  and  of  course  to  the  budget
deficit. The  difficulty  in  obtaining  a clear  diagnosis  of the inflationary
process  makes  the  cure  more  difficult. It reduces  the  government's  resolve  in
dealing  with  inflation  and  undermines  its  credibility,  thus  introducing  a
further  element  of  expectational  rigidity.
We may  note that  Sargent,  as representing  the  rational  expectations
school,  attaches  a critical  role  to  the  stabilization  policy  being  "widely
understood  and  widely  agreed  upon." It is  these  conditions  which,  according
to Sargent,  may  enable  a painless  and immediate  stopping  of inflation  both in
hyperinflation  or in  moderate  inflation  (Sargent  1986,  Ch.  4, pp.  113-115).
But  as we noted,  in  chronic  inflation  countries  which  developed  mechanisms  to
neutralize  the  effect  of inflationary  shocks,  the  causes  of inflationary
developments  are  rather  ambiguous. Hence  Sargent's  condition  for  a once  and
for  all  cure  are  not satisfied.
More  specifically,  what  Sargent  has in  mind  is a fiscal  cure  for
inflation.  However,  in  chronic  inflation  countries  inflation  may  increase
(even  in the  long  run)  as a result  of non-fiscal  causes. An instructive
example  for  this  event  is  the  upsurge  of inflation  in  Brazil  in  the  mid 1970s,
which  took  place  with  an apparently  balanced  budget.
The  latter  upsurge  seems  to  have  been  caused  by external  shocks  with
the  economy  approaching  full  employment,  and  by an accommodating  monetary
policy. However,  the  basic  causes  for  the  rising  of inflation  may  be deeper,
and  are  in fact  still  controversial.  The  nature  of the  appropriate  policies
for  this  situation  is  therefore  rather  unclear,  reducing  the  chances  of a once
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So far  we took  it for  granted  that  some  countries  develop  mechanisms
for  living  with  inflation  while  others  do not, Why is it,  however,  that
Bolivia  did  not  develop  such  mechanisms  (according  to  Morales)  while  others
did?  This  is a  difficult  question  which  requires  further  research.
Instead  of offering  an  explanation  we simply  point  out  again  the
fact  that  Bolivia  did  not  experience  extended  periods  of high  inflation  which
were  considered  as a normal  state  of affairs. It is the  latter  type  of
environment  which  is  conducive  to the  creation  of indexation  mechanisms.
Instead  Bolivia  was  a low  inflation  country,  which  adopted  a system  of a fixed
exchange  rate  and  which  experienced  some  temporary  inflationary  outbursts.
These  were  associated  with  two  hyperinflationary  developments  preceding  the
1956  and 1985  stabilizations,  and  with  the  devaluation  of 1972.UL-2/2-1-88  - 23 -
PART II*  ORTHODOX  STABILIZATION  IN CHRONIC  INFLATION  COUNTRIES
III.  Inflationary  Rigidities  Under  Alternative  Orthodox  Strategies
In the  foregoing  discussion  we pointed  out  difficulties  for
obtaining  quick  response  to stabilization  policies  in chronic  inflation
countries  when  the  "fundamental.,"  and  in  particular  the  government's  budget,
are  in  a reasonably  b*lanced  state. However,  one  of the  main  criticisms  of
Latin  American  stabilizations  is  that  they  do  not  deal  with  fundamentals  in a
serious  way. According  to this  view the  rigidities  due  to inertia  will
disappear  once  the  government  will  have  the  conviction  and  political  power  to
carry  out  a full  fledged  orthodox  stabilization.
In  this  part  we shall  examine  the  foregoing  criticism  in  view  of a
number  of past  stabilization  efforts  in  Latin  America. In particular,  we
shall  analyze  in  an impressionistic  manner  the  responsiveness  of inflation  to
some  serious  orthodox  stabilization  programs  based  on fiscal  and  monetary
measures  as well  as  other  programs  based  on a  combination  of fiscal  policies
and  exchange  rate  stabilization.
1.  Fiscal  Deficit  and  Monetary  Accommodation
Before  we approach  the  fiscal-monetary  stabilizations  we  have to
clarify  some  distinctions  between  fiscal  and  monetary  aspects  of stabilization
and  the  way  they  are  related  to the  concept  of inertia  and  monetary
accommodation.  The  related  statistical  concepts  are  primary,  quasi-fiscal  and
operational  deficits.
We shall  proceed  by  using  a theoretical  example  adopted  from  a paper
by Calvo  and  Fernandez  (1983). Consider  an inflation  tax  model  where  the  real
budget  deficit  (D)  is  defined  as the  difference  between  real  expenditures  andML-2/2-1-88  - 24 -
taxes.  This  definition  corresponds  to  what  is.  usually  called  primary  deficit
(i.e.,  total  expenditure,  excluding  interest  payments,  minus  taxes). The  size
of D is determined  by the  fiscal  authority  while  the  monetary  authorities  are
in  charge  of financing  this  deficit  as well  as of conducting  a banking  policy.
The  central  bank  supplies  the  treasury  with  base  money  to cover  D
and in  addition  pays interest  (ir)  on private  bank  reserves. Assume  for
simplicity  that  money  consists  only  of bank  deposits  (no  currency)  which  earn
an interest  id.  Thus,  bank  reserves  are identical  with  base  money.
If i denotes  the  market-interest  rate  on  commercial  loans  then  in  a
competitive  banking  system  we shall  have
i(l-a)  +  i  a  - i  (1) r  d
where  a is the  constant  reserve  ratio  ,  i.e.
h - aL  (2)
where  h is the  real  value  of the  monetary  base  and  L is the  demand  for  real
bank  deposits  ('money').  We assume  that  L depends  negatively  on i-idl/  which
by (1)  equals  a(i-idr. Assuming  further  that  i  equals  the  inflation  rate
(w) we may  writel/
1/  This  represents  the  opportunity  cost  of  holding  money.
2/  In the  foregoing  analysis  L should  be considered  as representing  total
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L - L (x)  ,x  a  (w-i r)  (3)
Now the  budget  deficit  equation  in steady  state  is  given  by
D *  (w  - ir)h which  indicates  that  the  seigniorage  wh  is  used to finance  the
fiscal  deficit  and  the  interest  on reserves. Then  using  (2),  we may  write
D - xL (x)  ; x =  a (x - ir)  (4)
which  shows  that  a  given  D determines  x  but  not  w.  The  latter  will  vary
inversely  with  a (if  v  >  ir)  and  directly  with ire
The  following  example  brings  out  some  important  conclusions.  First,
a given  budget  deficit  is  consistent  with  many inflation  rates. Second,  a
zero  budget  deficit  is  consistent  with  any  inflation  level  if ir  =  r. Thus,
if the  central  bank  returns  the  entire  seigniorage  to the  public  in the  form
of interest  on  bank  reserves  (which  implies  w =  id)  then  inflation  is
indeterminate.l/
In  view  of the  latter  indeterminateness  one  may  ask  why is it  that
the  Sargent-type  school  of rational  expectations  puts  so  much  weight  on
eliminating  D  as an immediate  cure  for inflation.  The  answer  would  probably
be  that  when  D  - 0 the  "natural"  solution  for  x  -0 is  x  =  ir  =  v  =  0 rather
than  ir  =  0  >  . This  can  be  rationalized  by  the  presumption  that  since  D  =  0
"there  is  no  reason"  for  agents  to  expect  v  > 0.
1/ When  we  take  account  of  currency  the  indeterminateness  of  v  with  D  =  0
requires,  in  addition,  that  the  central  bank  returns  to  the  public  the
amount  of  the  inflation  tax  on  currency.  The  latter  component  will  be
small  when  inflation  is  high,  since  real  currency  holdings  will  fall
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This  however  would  not  be the  case  at  all  in situations  where  agents
have  deep  rooted  expectations  for  continued  inflation. In that  case  the
central  bank  may  decide  to  validate  these  expectations  through  accommodating
monetary  policy  rather  than  face  unemployment.  The  source  of the  inflationary
expectations  may  vary.  It  could  result  from  a backward  looking  approach,  from
a basic  pessimism  about  the  government's  ability  to control  inflation  or from
the  public's  expectations  that  the  government  Intends  to  use  inflation  to
erode  real  wages  and  increase  employment  [as  in  Barro  and  Gordon  (1983)J.
A balanced  fiscal  budget  and  absence  of  monetary  accommodation  are
therefore  conceptually  different  entities. There  is  no logical  necessity  to
identify  D  - 0 with  v  - 0.  Thus  D  - 0 is  not  a sufficient  condition  for
w  - 0.  It  is however,  a necessary  one.  This  follows  from  the  fact  that
aL7x)  r
Hence  the  minimal  value  of  s  (with  a  - I  and  ir  O)  is  '.  - D  >  0.
It  will  be useful  to  keep  these  ideas  in  mind  when  we deal  with  stabilization
experiences.
One may  consider  the  interest  paid  on the  monetary  base  (irh)  as
"losses  of  the  central  bank"  or  "quasi-fiscal  deficit."  It  is  clear  from  the
f,regoing  discussion  that  elimination  of  fiscal  plus  quasi-fiscal  deficits
implies  an  end  to  inflation  in  the  long  run  since  D +  irh  - wh. It  must  be
realized  however  that  this  involves  not  only  the  requirement  that  the
government  lives  within  its  fiscal  constraint  but  also  it should  be  willing  to
grapple  with  the  problem  of stopping  accommodating  stubborn  inflationary
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It should  be noted  that  with  monetary  accommodation  the  quasi-fiscal
deficit  will  respond  endogenously  to  non-fiscal  causes  of inflation
(originating  for  example  in  wage pushes  or in  the  external  sector). To take
an extreme  example  suppose  that  the  proper  fiscal  def-cit  (D)  is  zero  but
there  is  full  monetary  accommodation  to  wage  push  inflation  so  that
- ir>  0.  Then the  quasi-fiscal  deficit  (irh)  can  be viewed  as the  effect
rather  than  the  cause  of the  increase  in inflation.  Therefore  the  inclusion
of the  latter  component  may  distort  the  causal  interpretation.
Finally  let  as clarify  the  concept  of  "operational  deficit." For
this  purpose  let  us introduce  the  possibility  of  bond  finance. Then (ignoring
the  private  banking  system)  we have the  budget  equation
D +  ib  =  B
B where  i  - r +  i  (r  being  the  real  interest  rate),  b =  is the  real  stock  of
government  bonds  (B  =  nominal  bonds,  P =  price  level)  and  H and  B  are  issues
B of new  money  and  new  bonds. Consider  a steady  state,  so that  v  .t.  Then  if
b is  constant  across  steady  states  and  D is  constant  we obtain  DP - D +  rb  - wh
which  determines  v.  Do is  the  "  operational  deficit"  which  is  the  relevant
concept  for  the  determination  of v  (is  the  long  run)  while  D +  ib - D  +  wb
represents  the  "borrowing  requirements"  which  are  determined  indirectly  by De,
Thus,  in this  model  the  cause  of long  term  inflation  is the
operational  deficit  while  "borrowing  requirements"  are  the  effect. Note  also
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borrowing  requirements  will  be  inflatedS1/ It  is for  these  reasons  that  the
operational  deficit  is the  more  appropriate  concept  for  economic  analysis.
2.  Flscal-based  Stabilization
We have  seen  that  a  sharp  cut  In the  budget  deficit  (from  over  20Z
of  GDP  to 3X),  in  addition  to  exchange  rate  stebilization  led  to  an abrupt
halt  of the  hyperinflationary  process  in Bolivia. We noted  that  the  precise
role  of the  exchange  rate  in the  stabilization  process  is controversial.
There  are  those  who think  that  the  fiscal  policy  was  the  major  factor  not  only
in the  medium  run  but  also  in the  initial  stage  of Bolivian  stabilization.  In
this  section  we shall  compare  the  above  results  with  some  other  orthodox
stabilizations  which  relied  mainly  on fiscal  adjustments  in a  non-
hyperinflationary  setting. We may  recall  the  argument  which  claims  that  in
general  the  fiscal  adjustment  by  Itself  may  not  be  sufficient  for
stabilization.
eO  The  Mexican  Stabilization  of 1983  _/
Let  us begin  with  the  Mexican  stabilization  of 1983  which  took  place
on the  background  of  a swelling  public  sector  deficit  (with  an  operational
deficit  reaching  101  of  GDP  In 1981),  a record  current  account  deficit
(reaching  6.7%  of GDP  in 1981  compared  with 2-3Z  in 1977-79),  a tremendous
increase  in the  public  debt  (doubling  between  1980  and 1982  in dollar  terms)
and  uncontrolled  Increases  in  nominal  wages.
1/ With  monetary  acco-odation  by the  Central  Bank  (as  in the  previous  model)
the  operational  deficit  may  resain  constant.
2/  This  part  is  based  on the  excellent  account  of  F. G. Diaz  (1983)  in
'Macroeconomic  policles,  adjustment  and  growth  in  the  long  run  (Mexico's
experience,"  World  Bank  sanuscript,  and  IMF  and  World  Bank  data.NL-2/2-1-88  - 29  -
In 1982  (the  last  year  of the  Lopez  Portillo  administration)  the
government  reacted  by  massive  devaluation  (70X  in  February  1982  followed  by
452 in  August)l/  and  announcing  a moderate  (3Z)  cut in  the  Federal  budget.
This  led to  an acceleration  of inflation  from  a rate  of around  20-30Z  in 1978-
81 to  about  100X  in 1982.
The  drastic  adjustment  began  in 1983  under  the  new  administration  of
Miguel  de la  Madrid  who  implemented  a cut  in the  operational  2/ budget  deficit
from  a level  of 102  of CDP  in 1981  and  6.52  in 1982  to a 2.1Z  in 1983-85  (see
Table  6a). According  to an  alternative  estimate  there  was in  fact  a small
surplus  in the  latter  years.3/ Note  also  the  even larger  reduction  in the
primary  deficit  (excluding  interest  payments  altogether),  falling  by 14X  of
CDP  between  1981  and 1983.
As a result  of the  shock  treatment  real  GDP  fell  by 52 in 1983.
Moreover,  in spite  of the  sharp  fiscal  measures,  and  the  general  recessionary
shock,  inflation  (measured  by  GDP  deflator)  remained  around  an annual  rate  of
902  in 1983,  falling  to  around  602  in 1984-5  end  then  rising  to  80Z in
1/  The second  devaluation  was  accompanied  by a segmentation  of the  market  for
foreign  exchange. The  actual  devaluation  would  be much  higher  (over  1002)
if  we were  to consider  the  value  of the  dollar  in  the  free  market.
2/  This includes  real  interest  on the  public  debt  on the  expenditure  side. A
surprise  jump  in inflation  may  create  a spurious  negative  relationship
with  the  operational  deficit  if  the  debt is  not  indexed  and  consequently
the statistical  ex-post  real  interest  rate  may become  negative. This
problem  does  not  arise  in  Brazil  where  internal  debt  is indexed,  but  seems
to  have  biased  downward,  to some  extent,  the  operational  deficit  for
Mexico  for  1982. This  difficulty  does  not  arise  of course  for  the  primary
deficit
3/  This  is  when  government  loans  to the  private  sector  are  excluded  from  the
expenditure  side,  which  seems  to be  a more  sensible  procedure. See  Dias,
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1986.1/ It seems  quite  clear  that  inflation  rose  to  a new  plateau  following
the  elimination  of the  operational  budget  deficit. The  program  was  however
successful  in  dealing  with  the  current  account  which  moved  from  a deficit  of
6.7Z  of GDP  to  a surplus  of 3.8X  in 1983  and  2.51  in 1984.
b.  Brazil  1983-4
The  developments  in  Brazil  since  1979  are  similar  to the  Mexican
experience  with respect  to the  deteriorating  current  account  deficit  (which
reached  a record  level  of 9Z of GDP  in 1982)  and  the  mounting  external  debt.
The  inflationary  situation  started,  however,  to deteriorate  much  earlier  than
in  Mexico. After  a plateau  of about  401  annual  inflation  in 1974-78  inflation
accelerated  to  around  75-85Z  in 1979-80  and  to 100l  in 1981-82. In these  two
years  the  operational  budget  deficit-/  increased,  reaching  81  of GDP in 1982
(Table  6b).
In order  to  deal  with these  difficulties  Brazil  undertook  in 1983-4
a  stabilization  program  supported  by an extended  agreement  with the  IMF. The
reduction  in  the  budget  deficit  was  the  key  element  in  the  program  which  was
intended  to  cut  in  half  the  current  account  deficit  and  reduce  the  inflation
rate  to  40Z in 1984  and  to 201  (annually)  in 1985.
.TL  p  war scesful  iin  reiducing  the  operational  fiscal
deficit  from  8.31  of GDP  in 1982  to  2.7Z  in 1984,  which  constituted  a drastic
change  by any  standard. However  the  results  were  quite  similar  to the  Mexican
experience.  The  current  account  deficit  fell  dramatically  from  8.91  of GDP in
1/  CPI  (within  year)  inflation  exceeded  10OZ  in 1986.
2/  Defined  as public  sector  borrowing  requirements  net  of "monetary
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1982  to 3.7X  in 1983  and  turned  to small  surplus  in 1984. However,  annual
inflation  doubled  (1)  rising  from  around  100X  in 1981-82  to 2002 in  1984  and
1985.
The  foregoing  examples  demonstrate  clearly  that  a deep  cut  in,  or
elimination  of,  the  operational  budget  deficit  is  not  a sufficient  condition
for  stopping  inflation.  One  may speculate  whether  a persistent  policy  of this
type  could  reduce  inflation  gradually  in the  long  run. The fact  that
inflation  seems  to  have  risen  to  a new  plateau!'  does  not point  to this
direction.  Recall  that  there  is  no theoretical  necessity  for  inflation  to  be
influenced  by  a budget  cut  which  is  not  accompanied  by nominal  policies. In
any  event,  it is  quite  clear  that  the  reaction  of inflation  to a sharp  budget
cut is  entirely  different  from  the  Bolivian  case.
We still  have  to  explain  what is  it that  caused  inflation  to  move
opposite  to the  budget  cut  and  what  kept  it  at the  new  level. As for  the
first  question  the  answer  seems  to lie  in  the  fact  that  the  main  objective  of
these  programs  was  to deal  with  the  external  crisis  rather  than  with
inflation. Not  only  were the  authorities  willing  to accept  larger  inflation,
but in  fact  the  acceleration  in inflation  served  as a tool  to reduce  the  real
wage  in order  to improve  the  current  account.
Table  6 shows  clearly  that  both  countries  stepped  up the  rate  of
nominal  devaluation  dramatically,  which  led  to an outburst  of inflation  and
eroded  the  real  wage  rst  significantly,  especially  in  Mexico. This in turn
helped  improved  the  current  account  in two  ways  --  by increasing
1/  In  Brazil  inflation  fell  temporarily  in 1986  due  to price  controls
implemented  in  the  Cruzado  plan.NL-2/2-1-88  - 32  -
competitiveness  and  by reducing  aggregate  private  consumption.l/  This  is  a
typical  case  where  the  acceleration  in inflation  was  not related  to a fiscal
objective. The increase  in inflation,  which  had its  origin  in the  faster
devaluation  of the  exchange  rates  was  an important  element  in the  adjustment
process.
The  next  question  is  whether  a one  time  reduction  in the  real  wage
should  be associated  with  an increase  in the  inflation  (and  devaluation)
plateau  rather  than  with  a one-time  jump  in  prices. When there  is formal  (as
in Brazil)  or informal  (as  in  Mexico)  backward  looking  indexation  in  which
nominal  wages  are  fully  adjusted  according  to  past  inflation,  a one time
change  in  the  price  level  will  only  have  a temporary  effect  on real  wages. On
the  other  hand,  an increase  in  the  rate  of inflation  will reduce  them
permanently  through  an acceleration  in the  deterioration  of the  purchasing
power  of  wages  over  the  period.2/ Indeed,  with  full3/  backward  indexation,  a
rise  in the  inflation  plateau  can  become  the  only  mechanism  to  bring  down  the
real  wage.
1/  Note  that  the  erosion  of the  real  wage in  the  foregoing  manner  relates  to
real  wages  in  terms  of consumables  which  is the  relevant  concept  from  the
point  of  view  of  affecting  absorption.  In the  presence  of non-traded
goods  this  is  a  different  concept  than  the  real  wage in  terms  of
tradeables,  which  is the  relevant  concept  from  the  point  of view  of
competitiveness.  It is  assumed  that  the  contractionary  fiscal  policy
which  leads  to a reduction  in  the  trade  deficit  requires,  in equilibrium,
a redaction  in  both  types  of real  wages,  jointly  with  a real  depreciation
of the  exchange  rate.
2/  In  this  case  full  backward  indexation  is  not sufficient  to  maintain  the
purchasing  power  of the  real  wage  as is  conventionally  measured  (i.e.,
w/p). A  wbetter  way to  measure  real  wages  is to  add  the  erosion  in
wages  (r-)  to the  standard  definition.  This,  of course,  assumes  that  the
frequenc of the  wage  adjustment  does  not  change  with  inflation. (For  a
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We refer  to the  Mexican  'ase  as one  where  the  budget  cut  was  not
accompanied  by adjustments  in  nominal  targets. This is  not  quite  accurate.
It can  be seen  in  Table  6 that  in 1984  there  was  an attempt  to slow  down the
rate  of  devaluation.  However,  this  was abandoned  in  the  following  years. In
fact  the  stepping  up of  devaluation  in 1986  and  the  corresponding  erosion  of
the  real  wage  are  once  again  a response  to the  deterioration  of the  current
account  and to  the  renewed  emphasis  on external  adjustment  which  dominated  the
design  of policy  in 1985-86. We therefore  consider  the  1982-86  period  as a
whole  as one  where  fiscal  contraction  was  not  associated  with  a systematic
policy  of slowing  down  the  rate  of devaluation.
What is  it that  keeps  inflation  at the  new  level? First,  since
inflation  plays  the  role  of  an equilibrating  mechanism,  a reduction  in
inflation  will  disrupt  equilibrium  in the  external  sector  by raising  real
wages. Therefore  slowing  down  the  rate  of  devaluation  will  not  appear  as
credible  and  will  make  domestic  prices  more  rigid  downward. Some  mechanism  of
this  kind  might  have  worked  in 1984  in  Mexico  when the  real  exchange  rate
dropped  below  a sustainable  level.
(continued  from  last  page)
2/  more thorough  discussion  of this  see  Lopez  and  Bacha  (1983).J  If the
frequency  of  wage  adjustment  increases,  as is  often  the  case  following  a
big  nominal  shock,  then  the  equilibrating  level  of inflation  must  rise
even  more.  In fact  in  Mexico  the  frequency  of wage  adjustments  increased
from  twice  a year  in 1982-85  to three,  and  later  to four  times  a year.
See  also  Ablin  (1985)  for  an  application  to the  Israeli  experience.
3/  In  Mexico  the  wage  compensation  lagged  behind  actual  inflation  in 1982-83
but  approached  full  compensation  later. We may  note  that  with  permanently
partial  compensation  the  developments  will  be similar  to those  described
in the  text  in the  medium  run  but  not  necessarily  in the  long  run.
However,  if the  process  is  protracted  then  the  basic  level  of inflationary
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Can  the  new  plateau  be maintained  in the  long  run?  It  can  be
claimed  that  in the  longer  run  the  base  wage  can  be adjusted  downward  and  the
intervals  of the  catch-up  adjustments  can  be lengthened  so  as to  enable  a
reduction  in inflation  without  changing  the  annual  real  wage.  However,  since
these  processes  take  a long  time  the  new  level  of inflation  tends  to entrench
itself  in  the  basic  inflationary  expectations.  The  monetary  system  and  the
payments  technology  adjust  to the  higher  inflation  level  and  support  its
continuation.
Will  the  whole  process  be reversed  when  there  is an improvement  in
external  conditions?  Not  necessarily..'  If  the  government  has  a bias  against
applying  strong  nominal  anchors  then  inflationary  expectations  will  tend to  be
asymmetrical,  exhibiting  downward  rigidity. Some  evidence  in this  point  is
provided  by the  reaction  of Brazil  and  Israel  to major  external  shocks. As
Figure  2 shows  the  positive  reaction  of inflation  to the  two  oil shocks  (in
1974  and 1979)  was  not  offset  by a fall  in  the  inflation  plateau  in the
intervening  period  when  the  terms  of trade  improved.2/
What  lessons  can  be drawn  from  these  experiences  for  future
stabilizations?  The  main  lesson  is that  it  is essential  that  stabilization
programs  should  supplement  the  fiscal  measures  by  appropriate  nominal
l/ Note that  an increase  in  the  real  wage,  (which  is  warrented  by  market
conditions)  can  be  accomplished  by a one  time  upward  adjustment  in the
nominal  (base)  wage  rather  than  by slowing  down  of inflation. This  option
is  not  open  for  a reduction  in the  real  wage if  nominal  wages  are  rigid
downward.
2/  There  were  of course  various  other  developments  that  affected  the  rate  of
inflation  over  these  years,  the  full  analysis  of which  is outside  the
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anchors. This is  not  an easy  task,  as the  following  discussion  will  make
amply  clear. It is  even  a  more  difficult  undertaking  in a state  of balance  of
payments  difficulties.  Under  a given  scheme  of  wage indexation  a reduction  in
inflation  (implied  by  using  nominal  anchors)  will raise  the  real  wage,  which
will  not  be consistent  with  dealing  with  the  external  disequilibrium.
It is  clear  therefore  that  in  the  foregoing  situation  the
stabilization  program  requires  changing  the  rules  of  wage setting,  so  that  a
reduction  in  the  real  wage could  be achieved  jointly  with  controlling
inflation.  This is in  fact  what  Chile  did  in 1982  by deindexing  wages  and  by
introducing  greater  flexibility  in  the  real  wage through  the  elimination  of
the  "wage  floor"  established  by the 1979  legislation. In  other  political
environments  the  foregoing  policies  may  not  be feasible  except  within  a
framework  of some  heterodox  package  to  which  we shall  refer  briefly  in the
final  section.
3.  The  Fiscal-Monetary  Combination
We have just  noted  that  fiscal  policy  by itself  cannot  provide  the
nominal  anchor  which  is  needed  for  stabilization.  We also  know  that  the
central  bank  could  eventually  bring  about  price  stability  if it  would
discontinue  the  accommodation  of inflation  through  the  quasi-fi£calc  nial.
However,  it is  argued  that  such  a step  would  cause  excessive  unemployment  when
-there  are  strong  inertial  forces  in the  inflationary  process.
The fact  that  it is  difficult  to  find  examples  of a  serious  monetary
crunch  in  chronic  inflation  countries  can  be interpreted  in  two  ways. On the
one  hand  one  may  argue  that  this  is  an indirect  proof  of the  existence  of
inertia,  since  the  governments  are  afraid  to risk  massive  unemployment.  On
the  other  hand,  it  can  be argued  (by  monetarists)  that  this  indicates  that  theNL-2/2-1-88  - 36 -
government  does  not  appreciate  the  role  of money  in the  inflationary  process
and is therefore  reluctant  to  apply  strict  monetary  measures. Had the
government  tried  seriously  to  practice  monetary  restraint  the  inertia  thesis
might  be repudiated.
a.  The  Chilean  Experiment
Among  the  few  cases  where  the  government  applied  a fairly  persistent
monetary  crunch  in  the  face  of  accelerating  inflation  is  the  Chilean
stabilization  of 1974-5,  following  the  overthrow  of the  Allende  regime  amidst
severe  economic  imbalances.  The  monetary  crunch  was part  of a comprehensive
stabilization  program  which  included  a most  drastic  cut  in  the  budget  deficit
--  from  25%  of  GDP in 1973  to 10.5%  in 1974  and  2.6  in 1975  (see  Table  7a).
It is  because  these  policies  were  followed  in  a persistent  and
decisive  manner  by  a tough  military  regime  which  embraced  a free  market
philosophy  that  this  program  stands  out  as a classical  orthodox
stabilization.  The  Chilean  stabilization  seems  therefore  to provide  one  of
those  rare  cases  of a social  experiment  where  we can  test  the  efficiency  of
the  orthodox  fiscal-monetary  package  in  chronic-inflation  countries.
The  results  of this  experiment,  (and  related  experiments  in  the
Southern  Cone)  are  documented  in  many studies. Among  the  more  recent  ones  are
the  contributions  of  Foxley  (1983),  Corbo  (1983),  Ramos  (1986)  and  Edwards
(1987)  on which  we draw  heavily. As is  well  known  the  results  of the  fiscal-
monetary  phase  of the  Chilean  experiment  (where  the  exchange  rate  policy  was
basically  to  maintain  PPP)  were  quite  disappointing  from  the  orthodox-
monetarist  point  of view.
During  this  phase  which  lasted  from  September  1973  to  June 1976  the
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in 1973  did  not  fall  below  250Z  (annualized)  at the  end  of this  period. This
sluggishness  of inflation  was accompanied  by a  dramatic  rise  in  unemployment-
(from  4.6Z  in 1973  to 16.8Z  in 1975)  while  real  GNP  fell  14.4  Z  in 1975  (see
Table  7a).
These  results  should  be clearly  very  disturbing  for  the
monetarists. Surely  the  severe  cut  in the  budget  deficit  cannot  be denied  but
some  doubts  were  raised  with  respect  to the  existence  of a  monetary  crunch  in
view  of the  fact  that  the  nominal  money  supply  continued  to rise  at  high  rates
[Harberger  (1981)]. However,  the  relevant  question  is  whether  monetary  growth
was contractionary  relative  to the  force  of inflationary  inertia.
The  data  on the  ratio  of  M2 to  CNP  can  throw  some  light  on this
question. Table  7a shows  that  this  ratio  fell  dramatically  in the  1974-76
period. Note  also  that  during  this  period  the  ratio  did  not  change  much  in
spite  of the  fact  that  inflation  fell  gradually. A fall  in inflation  leads  to
an increase  in  money  demand. This  constitutes  indirect  evidence  of a  monetary
crunch.
It should  also  be noted  that  when  prices  were  deregulated  in the
last  quarter  of 1973  consumer  prices  rose (on  a  quarterly  basis)  by 128.5%
while  M2 rose  only  45.7%  (Fozley  (1983),  Table  8]. *Thus,  there  can  be little
doubt  that  monetary  policy  was  highly  non-accommodative  from  the  start
relative  to the  sluggish  inflation.  This is  also  the  evaluction  of  Foxley
(1983)  who  attributes  the  recession  which  developed  in 1974  towards  the
beginning  of 1975  to the  foregoing  monetary  crunch  (Foxley,  op.  cit.,  p. 53).
1/  The  contractionary  policies  which  increased  unemployment  were  motivated
not  only  by disinflation  but  also  by the  deterioration  in the  external
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In spite  of the  monetary  crunch  and  the  reduction  in the  budget
deficit,  inflation  stabilized  in 1974  around  45Z  per  quarter  which  is  an
indication  of considerable  rigidity. The  continued  rigidity  of inflation  in
1975  is  often  attributed  to the  consequences  of the  sharp  fall  in the  price  of
copper  in  the  end  of 1974  which  induced  large  devaluations  in the  beginning  of
1975.
It should  be  pointed  out,  however,  that  the  government  undertook  a
severe  cut in  the  fiscal  deficit  in conjunction  with  the  levaluations.  The
sharp  reduction  in  the  fiscal  deficit  in 1975  included  a cut  of 27X  in  real
government  expenditures  (Foxley  op.  cit.,  p. 55). Since  the  fiscal  side
supported  the  devaluations  there  was  in principle  no need  for  the  latter  to
slow  down  the  reduction  of inflation,  were it  not  for  the  inertial  forces.
This  is specially  the  case  in  view  of the  continued  policy  of tight  money
during  1975  (according  to the  evaluation  of Edwards,  op.  cit.,  pp.  31-33).
Thus,  the  results  of this  case  stand  out  in sharp  contrast  with  the  Bolivian
experiment  where,  in  spite  of the  severe  external  shock  during  the
stabilization,  control  over  inflation  was  reestablished  very  rapidly.
Another  approach  to  the  price  sluggishness  [Foxley  (1983)]  is  based
on the  rational  behavior  of oligopolistic  firms  in  an environment  of
uncertainty  concerning  government  policies  and  the  reactions  of the
competitors.  It  is argued  that  the  reaction  to  demand-based  stabilization
tends  to be sluggish  because  of the  absence  of clear  signaling.  A somewhat
related  argument  was  advanced  by Dornbusch  and  Simonsen  (1986)  who  point  out
that  firms  may  adopt  a "wait  and  see"  policy  which  will  slow  down  the
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With  all the  sluggishness  of the  price  response  we should  not  forget
that  inflation  was coming  down in  Chile,  albeit  slowly. In this  respect  the
policies  were  more  effective  than  the  experierces  of Brazil  and  Mexico  in the
1980s  where  inflation  advanced  to  a new  plateau  following  the  stabilization
shock  (combined  with an  external  crisis). This  difference  is  probably
attributable  to  the  fact  that  the  Chilean  experiment  implemented  a monetary
crunch  which  provided  some  nominal  anchor  for  inflation  while  this  was  not the
case  in the  other  experiments.
b.  Argentina  1976-8
In the  corresponding  Argentinian  experiment,  following  the  overthow
of the  Peronist  government,  the  fiscal-monetary  stage  lasted  two  years,
starting  April  1976  [see  Ramos  (1986)]. During  the  last  year  of the  latter
government  inflation  was  raging  at about  450% in  annual  terms.
The  policies  of the  new  military  regine  were  directed  by  Martinez  de
Hoz  who  initiated  a stabilization  policy  based  on  a sharp  budget  cut (reducing
the  public  sector  deficit  from 10%  of  GDP in 1975  to 3% in 1977,  according  to
Ramos  (1986)1.!/  This  was  accompanied  by tightening  of monetary  policy  in
1976  and  in the  first  half  of 1977  which  is  reflected  by a drop  in the  M2/GNP
ratio  (see  Table  7.b). Examination  of  quarterly  data  reveals  that  while
inflation  fell  considerably  with the  initiation  of  Martinez  de Hoz  policies
real  M2 did  not  increase  as expected,  indicating  a contractionary  monetary
policy.
1/ According  to  de Pablo  and  Martinez'  (1937)  data,  the  public  sector  deficit
was  reduced  from  15.61  in 1975  to 5% in 1977. Excluding  interest  payments
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The fiscal-monetary  stage  of Martinez  de Hoz  policies  was  quite
successful  in reducing  the  rate  of inflation  immediately  from  500%  to  around
150%  (annual)  with  a relatively  small  cost  in terms  of unemployment  (see  Table
7.b). This  looks  much  more favorable  than  the  Chilean  experience.  This
success  is  attributable  to  a large  extent  to the  nominal  anchors  which  were
applied  during  this  stage.  These  included,  in addition  to contractionary
monetary  policy,  the  imposition  of severe  controls  on nominal  wages  (which
reduced  real  wages  by about  30%  in 1976). We should  also  point  out  that  the
undervaluation  of the  exchange  rate  towards  the  end  of the  Peronist  regime
enabled  Martinez  de Hoz  to slow  down  the  rate  of nominal  devaluation  during
the  early  stage  of this  program.
Two  conclusions  emerge  from  this  phase. First,  the  use  of nominal
anchors  is  essential  in  making  the  budget  cut  effective  in reducing
inflation.  Second,  in spite  of the  comprehensive  policy  (which  also  included
an attempt  of using  income  policies  for  four  months)  inflation  stayed  at a
plateau  of 150%  (annually).  Thus  whilce  both  the  Chilean  and  Argentinian
stabilization  (during  the  fiscal-monetary  stage)  succeeded  in  averting
hyperinflation  they  could  not  reduce  inflation  to  low  levels.
Can  this  failure  be  attributed  to an insufficient  cut in  the  budget
deficit? While  this  may  have been  the  case,  it is  not immediately  obvious  why
the  sharp  initial  cut  in the  budget  deficit  should  not  make the  fiscal  policy
credible. It should  be noted  that  to the  extent  that  the  government  has the
possibility  of financing  its  deficit  through  bonds,  price  stability  does  not
require  a balanced  budget  in  every  period  but  rather  over  a long  time  horizon.
As a further  indication  of downward  rigidity  of inflation  we should
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the  Peronist  regime. This  seems  to indicate  the  existence  of a ratchet
effect,  since  the  size  of the  public  deficit  (relative  to  GNP)  was  about  the
same  as in the  early  1970s  and  there  was  ne sign  of a deterioration  in the
external  accounts  as  measured  by the  external  debt  relative  to  exports.
It is  because  of dissatisfaction  with the  slow  pace  of price
adjustment  under  the  fiscal-monetary  package  that  Southern  Cone  countries
switched  in the  second  part  of the  1970s  to exchange  rate  based  stabilization
(Ramos,  op.  cit.). A similar  switch  took  place  in  other  stabilizations  as
well (for  example,  in the  Frondizi  stabilization  in Argentina  in 1959  (to  be
discussed  later)).
4.  Exchange  Rate  Based  Stabilization
a.  General  Considerations
By an  exchange  rate  based  stabilization  we mean  a policy  designed  to
reduce  inflation  by using  a package  with  the  fiscal  adjustment  as the  main
real  policy  variable  and  the  exchange  rate  as the  main  nominal  anchor. This
does  not  mean  necessarily  that  the  exchange  rate  is to be fixed. A low
crawling  peg  or  a gradually  reduced  rate  of devaluation  in  the  Tablita  fashion
will  also  serve  the  purpose  of providing  a  nominal  anchor  as long  as it is
determined  as an  exogenous  policy  parameter.  However,  for  the  sake  of
simplicity,  we shall  focus  in the  following  theoretical  discussion  on the
fixed  exchange  rate  case.
The  fiscal  support  for  the  exchange  rate  based  stabilization  is
essential. This  is especially  the  case  because  money  tends  to become
endogenous,  depending  on the  degree  of capital  mobility. However,  fixing  the
exchange  rate  can  be maintained  for  a while,  causing  a reduction  in inflation,
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reserves  as  a result  of capital  imports,  following  the  increase  in the  demand
for  money  creates  a deceptive  impression  of success. In  addition,  no
recessionary  side  effects  emerge  as in  the  case  of  using  the  monetary
anchor. However,  when  the  exchange  rate  is  fixed  in the  foregoing  scenario
the  costs  appear  at a later  stage,  involving  an eventual  loss  of reserves  and
a possible  balance  of payments  crisis. The  analysis  of  using  the  exchange
rate  as a nominal  anchor  must  therefore  focus  on issues  of sustainability.
From  the  fiscal  point  of  view,  sustainability  of a fixed  exchange
rate  stabilization,  as of  any  other  stabilization  policy,  requires
government's  long  term  solvency. This  means  that  the  program  should  not
induce  a rate  of growth  of public  debt  which  exceeds  in the  long  run  the  real
interest  ratei  The  special  feature  of exchange  rate  stabilization  is that
solvency  should  be achieved  without  inflation  tax  generated  by devaluations.
Lack  of solvency  implies  that  the  government  does  not  Intend  to  repay  its  debt
and therefore  this  situation  must  lead  to some  form  of crisis  in the  asset
markets  which  can  be expected  to take  the  shape  of a run  on the  central  bank's
reserves.
However,  since  solvency  involves  long  term  fiscal  policies,  its
existence  is a matter  of conjecture. In  this  type  of situation,  it  is natural
for  agents  (domestic  citizens,  foreign  banks,  etc.)  to set  some  limits  on the
size  of  public  borrowing  which  is  still  deemed  consistent  with solvency2/
The  lower  is the  credibility  in fiscal  solvency,  the  tighter  the  limits. In
particular,  a low  degree  of fiscal  credibility  will  reduce  the  maximal  level
1/  See  discussion  in Helpman  and  Leiderman  (1987).
2/  In principle  this  is  similar  to  the  public's  reaction  to a central  bank
which  can  conceal  its  intentions  [see  Canzonery  (1985)1.NL-2/2-1-88  - 43  -
of net  foreign  indebtedness  of the  central  bank,  thus  putting  a strain  on
ianaging  the  fixed  exchange  rate. Hence  sustainability  requires  not  only
potential  solvency  (which  cannot  be  verified  ln practlce)  but  also  the
conformity  with  some 'liquidity  limits." It  is the  existence  of these  limits
which  explains  why  fiscal  discipline  is  essential  not  only  in the  long  run  but
In the  short  run  as  well.
An unsustainable  program,  from  the  fiscal  point  of  view,  is one ehich
is bound  to hit  the  foregoing  limits. The  literature  on balance  of payments
crises  [following  Krugman's  (1979)  seminal  paper]  Ls  of this  variety. In  view
of the  numerous  failures  of exchange  rate  based  stabilizations,  we ust  ask
whether  lack  of fiscal  support  was the  basic  cause  for  the  failures? As we
shall  see  the  answer  is  not  always  so simple.
An exchange  rate  stabilization  program  say  also  fail  because  of
other  reasons. Consider  the  case  of inertia  due to  backward  looking
indexation  or staggered  nominal  contracts. This  factor  by Itself  will cause  a
real  appreciation  in  the  early  phase  of stabilization  which  may  generate  a
cycle  of capital  inflows  and  out  lows  with  a potential  of creating  a balance
of payments  crisis-all  this  with  a  balanced  budget.
The  foregoing  scenario  reflects  the  assessment  that  after  a  certain
point  the  overvaluation  cannot  be  expected  anymore  to  be  corrected  by  a
downward  adjustment  In  domestic  inflation,  thus  increasing  the  likelihood  of  a
maxi  devaluation.  It  follows  that  lack  of  credibility  in  the  price  adjustment
capability  may  play  a  significant  role  in  the  abandonment  of  exchange  rate
stabilization  (we  shall  elaborate  on this  point  later).
Lack  of  credibility  can  also  be  associated  with the  government's
determination  to  maintain  a fixed  exchange  rate  In the  face  of wage  pushes.
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accommodate  by  devaluation. This  is  another  form  of interaction  between
inertia  and  lack  of credibility  which  may ruin  the  stabilization  effort.
As  an introduction  to the  analysis  of the  data  let  us consider  first
the  nominal  and  real  effects  of a temporary  exchange  rate  stabilization  policy
which  is  unsustainable  because  of insufficient  reduction  in the  budget
deficit. Assume  that  the  foregoing  phase  (Stage  I)  is followed  by a switch  of
policies  which  leads  to a  sustainable  situation  (Stage  II).  In  infinite
horizon  Ricardian  models  pegging  the  nominal  exchange  rate  in Stage  I  will  not
cause  by itself  any  variation  in the  real  exchange  rate  within  this  interval
and  therefore  the  price  level  can  be fully  stabilized  during  this  stage [as  is
implicit  in the  models  of Drazen  and Helpman  (1987),  Obstfeld  (1985)  and Calvo
(1987)  when  exogenous  real  variables  are  static].
This  will  not  be the  case,  however,  in non-Ricardian  models 
Continued  budget  deficits  during  Stage  I  will  increase  the  public's  assets
(not  fully  offset  by  future  taxes). This  will  in turn  increase  demand  for
domestic  goods,  causing  a real  appreciation  and  continuation  of inflation  in
non-tradeables.
The  effect  of a (fiscally)  unsustainable  stabilization  on the  level
of real  variables,  in infinite  horizon  models,  is  not  clear  cut. As Drazen
and  Helpman  point  out,  the  effect  in Stage  I depends-on  the  nature  of.  the
policies  in Stage  II.  For  example,  a current  account  deficit  will  emerge  in
Stage  I if  the  budget  is to  be balanced  eventually  by  a cut in  government's
expenditures  on traded  goods  (as  required  by the  intertemporal  external
1/  This  includes  models  of the  Krugman  (1979)  type,  as  well  as finite  horizon
models  of the  Blanchard  variety,  as for  example,  in Helpman  and Razin
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balance). If,  however,  Stage  II is based  on balancing  through  the  inflation
tax  then  no  external  imbalance  is implied  for  Stage  I.
The  latter  result  differs  substantially  from  Calvo  (1987)  who  shows
that  in a similar  experiment,  spending  will increase  in Szage  I causing  a real
appreciation  and  a current  account  deficit. The  reason  is that  in Calvo's
model  (of  the  "cash  in  advance"  type)  real  money  balances  are  proportional  to
consumption.  hence  a  reduction  in inflation  in Stage  I  reduces  the  cost  of
consumption  in this  stage  (via  a reduction  in the  cost  of holding  money)
relative  to Stage  II.  Basically,  it is  the  temporariness  of  exchange  rate
stabilization  which  produces  the  current  account  deficit  in  Stage  I, rather
than  the  budget  deficit  itself.
A  temporary  stabilization  produces  similar  results  in  an infinite
horizon  model  studied  by  Obstfeld  (1985). As in Calvo  (1987)  the  critical
assumption  is that  consumption  of  goods  and  of liquidity  services  are
complements. The  intuition  seems  to  be that  as  money  balances  rise,  due  to a
reduction  in  inflation,  the  marginal  utility  of consumption  increases,  while
the  opposite  is true  for  the  higher  inflation  period. This  induces  an
intertemporal  substitution  in consumption  leading  to  a current  account  deficit
1/ in Stage  I.-
It is  interesting  to note  that  the  perception  of the  stabilization
as being  temporary  will  also  advance  the  purchase  time  of imported  durable
1/ While  the  Obstfeld-Calvo  models  are  very  attractive  we should  point  out
that  their  results  depend  on the  treatment  of real  balances  in a
consumption  context  only.  If  we consider,  alternatively,  real  balances  as
a factor  of production  then  the  low  inflation  period  will  be characterized
by relatively  high  output,  part  of which  may  be transferred  to the  high
inflation  period  through  a current  account  surplus  and  accumulation  of
foreign  assets. Thus  the  production  aspect  tends  to offset  the
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goods  (especially  if  trade  restrictions  are  expected  in the  future),
aggrevating  the  current  account  situation.
In  myopic  non-Ricardian  models  the  increase  in  the (perceived)  net
worth  of the  private  sector,  as a result  of fiscal  deficits  will,  of course,
generate,  during  the  stabilization  phase,  a current  account  deficit  and  a real
appreciation  in  a more  direct  fashion.
What  about  a stabilization  where  the  budget  is balanced  by lump  sum
taxes  during  the  exchange  rate stabilization  period  (Stage  I),  but the
financing  by the  inflation  tax  is  to be resumed  in  Stage  II?  In the  myopic
models  this  will  tend  to stabilize  domestic  pricesl/  in Stage  I  without
causing  a current  account  deficit. Similar  results  will  be obtained  in
infinite  horizon  models  where  money  and  goods  are  separable  in  the  utility
function. However,  in the  Obstfeld-Calvo  models,  the  low-high  inflation  cycle
will still  generate  a current  account  deficit  in  Stage  I.  A similar  effect
will  hold  for  durable  goods  imports. In the  presence  of long  term  contracts
the  expectations  of  higher  future  inflation  will  also  be reflected  in the  new
nominal  contracts,  thus  contributing  to  current  real  appreciation.
An exchange  rate  based  stabilization  can  be unsustainable  even  with
a eonsistently  balanced  budget,  because  of reasons  mentioned  earlier. This
case  will  be discussed  in section  4c,  5 and  in the  appendix.
We turn  now  to examine  some  important  experiments  of exchange-rate-
based  stabilizations  in the  light  of the  foregoing  remarks. The  experiences
of  Argentina,  Chile  and  Uruguay  are  particularly  illuminating  in this  respect,
especially  if  you  look  at them  from  a  medium  to long  term  perspective.
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b.  Lessons  from  Argentina's  Stabilizations
In this  section  we shall  analyze  the  major  exchange  rate  based
stabilizations  in  Argentina  over  the  past  30 years. We include  only  those
programs  which  were combined  with  a serious  cut  in the  budget  deficit  before,
or jointly  with,  the  stabilization  of the  exchange  rate.  It is the  use  of the
exchange  rate  as a nominal  anchor  in  these  programs  which  contributed  to the
positive  correlation  between  budget  cuts  and  inflation  which  we observe  in
Figure  3, in  contrast  with  Mexican-Brazilian  experience  of the  1980s.
We shall  briefly  describe  four  major  stabilization  programs  which
took  place  over  this  time  span. The  earliest  one is  the  Frondizi
stabilization'/  which  started  in the  end  of 1958  following  an  upsurge  of
inflation  and  a deterioration  of the  external  position. The program  started
with a fiscal  monetary  package  and  switched  in  mid-1959  to  a full
stabilization  of the  exchange  rate  which  was  maintained  till  the  beginning  of
1962  when the  exchange  rate  was  devalued.  Throughout  this  period,  and
afterwards,  the  policies  were in  accordance  with  an IMP  agreement.
The  next  stabilization  was  undertaken  by the  dictatorial  military
government  of  General  Ongania  and  directed  by the  Finance  Minister  Krieger
Vasena. This  was  a fiscal-exchange-rate  package  from  the  start  (in  early
1967)  and  contained  significant  heterodox  policies.2/  It  was based  on a
complete  peg  of the  exchange  rate  till  the  beginning  of 1970  when  exchange
rate  policy  became  more flexible.
1/  See  M. Thorp  (1965)
?:/ See  de Pablo  and  Martinez  (1987).NL-2/2-1-88  - 48 -
The third  stabilization  was  that  of  Martinez  de Hoz,  where  the
exchange  rate  became  the  main  nominal  anchor  with the  beginning  of the  tablita
policy  in  early  1979.1/ It  was  abandoned  in  the  beginning  of 1981  in  the
midst  of a severe  crisis. The  last  stabilization  is the  Austral  plan!/  which
was  a heterodox  fiscal-exchange-rate  package  which  started  in  June 1985  by the
Alfonsin  administration  with  a complete  pegging  of the  exchange  rate.  The  peg
was shifted  to  a crawl  in  April  1986  and  price  controls  were  made  more
flexible  from  the  middle  of the  year.
Figures  4 show  that  one  common  feature  of all  four  stabilizations  in
the  U-shaped  pattern  of the  budget  deficit.3/ There  is  always  a drastic
reduction  in the  deficits  at the  beginning  of the  program  and  the  fiscal
discipline  remains  in  effect  for  some  time;  however,  at a later  stage,  the
budget  deficit  returns  to, if  not  exceeds  the,  levels  prevailing  prior  to  the
plan.  The  reduction  in  the  rate  of devaluation  is  the  dominating  force  in
pulling  down  inflation4/  but  this  policy  is  always  abandoned  with (or  after)
the  rise  in the  fiscal  deficit. It seems  hard  to dispute  the  conclusion  that
in  Argentina  the  basic  cause  for  the  failure  of stabilization  programs  is the
1/  See  Calvo  (1986)  and  Ramos  (1986).
2/  For  an analysis  of this  plan  and  a comparison  with the  Israeli  1985
stabilization  program.  see  Blejer  and  Liviatan  (1987).
3/  Deficit  data  are  based  on  de Pablo  and  Martinez  (1987). Other  data  World
Bank  and  IFS,  except  for  Figure  4d  which  is based  on Machinea  (1987). The
deficit  does  not include  the  quasi-fiscal  deficit  of the  central  bank.
4/  This  is seen  clearly  in figure  4C  where  the  deficit  started  rising  in 1978
while  inflation  continued  to  be pulled  down  by the  declining  rate  of
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inability  to persist  with  the  contraction  of the  fiscal deficit. This is  the
main  lesson  from  Argentina's  history  of stabiliziv-  inflation.
Another  feature  of the  programs  is  that  in spite  of the  cut  in the
budget  deficit  the  current  account  deteriorated  continuously  from  the
beginning  of exchange  rate  stabilization,  accompanied  by a reduction  in  the
real  exchange  rate  and  an increase  in real  wages. The  current  account  fell  to
negative  values  which  points  to ur.sustainability.
We may  consider  the  deterioration  in the  current  account  and  the
real  appreciation  from  three  points  of  view--backward  looking,  myopic  and
forward  looking. A pattern  of staggered  nominal  contracts  inherited  from  the
high inflation  period  will  of course  slow  down  the  pace  of  adjustment  in
domestic  inflation  leading  to a real  appreciation.
From  the  point  of view  of  myopic,  non-Ricardian  models  there  is the
effect  of an increase  in the  private  sector's  net  worth  as a result  of fiscal
deficits  during  the  stabilization  phase  leading  to the  aforementioned
development  in  the  current  account,  as  explained  earlier. However,  given  the
relatively  low  levels  of the  fiscal  deficits  during  most stabilizations-/  and
the  remaining  inflation  during  this  stage,  the  quantitative  effect  of this
mechanism  can  only  be partial.
We may  consider  alternatively  a forward  looking  approach  based  on
expectations  of a reversal  of the  stabilization  policy. This  approach,  based
on lack  of credibility  in  persistence  of fiscal  policies,  is appealing  because
it corresponds  to the  actual  experiences.  Using  this  approach  we can  envisage
several  channels  through  which  the  observed  phenomena  can  be generated.
1/  In the  Martinez  de Hoz  Tablita  period  the  deficit  was  relatively  high
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First  there  is the  Obstfeld-Calvo  substitution  effect  in
consumption-  which  we described  earlier. Then there  is  the  durable-imports
effect  in  anticipation  of future  devaluation  and possible  import
restrictions.  There  is  also the  effect  of the  new longer-term  nominal
contracts  which  take  into  account  the  expected  increase  in  prices. This tends
to slow  down the  pace  of  domestic  disinflation  thus  causing  a real
appreciation  which  tends  to  worsen  the  current  account  (as  in  Keynesian  open
economy  models).
So  far  we  mentioned  factors  that  may  explain  the  low  level  of she
real  exchange  rate  during  temporary  disinflation.  However,  we should  also
take  into  account  the  continuous  decline  in the  real  exchange  rate  during  this
phase. This is just  another  way  of looking  at the  slow  rate  of adjustment  in
domestic  inflation,2-  which  has  important  implications  on interest  rates  which
in turn  affect  the  adjustment  process  in the  course  of  disinflation.
When the  rate  of  devaluation  is  reduced  and  domestic  inflation
adjusts  slowly  there  is  a tendency  for  domestic  interest  rates  to exceed  the
cost  of  borrowing  abroad  if  capital  market  do  not  adjust  instantaneously.
This  will create  a tendency  for  capital  inflows. Indeed,  an accompanying
1/  In the  Tablita  period,  1979-80,  consumption  was  relatively  high.  An
increase  in  consumption  was  also  observed  in the  Vasena  stabilization.
2/ We attribute  the  origins  of the  slow  adjustment  of domestic  prices  to
inertial  factors  and  to  credibility  considerations.  We should  point  out
however,  that  the  same  result  concerning  the  continuous  fall  in  the  real
exchange  rate  can  be explained  by the  Obstfeld  (1985)  model  if  the
announced  rate  of  devaluation  declines  gradually. Indeed,  this  fits  the
Martinez  de Hoz  experiment,  but  not  the  other  cases,  where  the  nominal
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feature  of the  early  phase  of stabilization  in  all  four  programs  were  the
capital  inflows. These  are  partly  due  to an increase  in the  demand  for  money
as  a result  of the  lower  level  of inflation  and  in response  to  GDP  growth.
However,  in addition,  part  of the  inflows  may  have  been  generated  by the
process  of  arbitrage  in the  presence  of Interest  differentials  (after  taking
account  of expected  devaluation),  as stated  earlier.
With  perfect  capital  mobility  the  effect  of sluggish  adjustment  in
domestic  inflation  is to  reduce  the  domestic  real  interest  rate  in the  early
phase  of stabilization.  This  is  so because  under  these  conditions  the
interest  rate  parity  holds,  so that  i - i* +  £  where  I  and  i* are  domestic  and
foreign  nominal  interest  rates  and e  is the  expected  rate  of nominal
devaluation.  The  domestic  expenditure-based  real  interest  rate  is r  - i -
where r  is the  expenditure-weighted  expected  rate  of  domestic  inflation.
Hence,  r  - i*  +  (e  - r),  i.e.,  r  equals  the  foreign  interest  rate  plus  the
expected  real  devaluations  of the  currency.i'
Now  in the  early  stage  of disinflation  the  typical  program  enjoys
credibility  for  an appropriate  short  run  so that  e  is  close  to the  low  actual
rate.  Hence  if ;  adjusts  slower  then  a reduction  in the  actual  rate  of
devaluation  will  reduce  (c  - ;) causing  a reduction  in the  real  interest
rate.  This,  in  turn,  will  cause  an increase  in  consumption2/  and  investment
outlays,  which  will  also  increase  the  level  of  economic  activity  with  a
1/  Alternatively,  r  - r*  + (c  +  1*  - ;),  i.e.,  r equals  the  foreign  real
interest  rate  plus  expected  devaluation  of the  real  exchange  rate  of
commodities  which  is the  price  ratio  of foreign  and  domestic
goods  (w*  denotes  foreign  inflation).
2/  The  effect  of the  expenditure-based  real  interest  rate  on consumption,  in
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multiplier  effect. mhe  latter  expansion  will  exacerbate  the  tendencies  for
real  appreciation  and  a  worsening  of the  current  account.
The  foregoing  mechanismJ./  provides  a  possible  explanation  for  the
fact  that  in  all  four  programs  the  deterioration  in the  current  account  (at
least  in  the  early  stage)  was  associated  with  an  upsurge  in the  level  of
economic  activity  following  the  initiation  of exchange  rate  stabilization  (see
figure  4 lower  panels).
With  continuous  deterioration  of the  current  account  and  in
anticipation  of fiscal  relaxation  the  probability  of a  maxi-devaluation
increases,  raising  the  expected  rate  of devaluation.  This  leads  eventually  to
a  reversal  in  GDP  growth  and  to a  dlimnution  in  capital  inflowsw2/
It  seems  that  time  and  again  Argentina  Indulged  in  unsustainable
economic  expansion  in  the  course  of the  stabilization  programs. We have  shown
that  this  phenemenon  might  be related  in part  to  sluggish  price  adjustment
which  has  its  roots  in the  structure  of staggered  prices  and  wages  combined
with  lack  of credibility  in  the  sustainability of fiscal  policies. In
principle  these  premature  expansions  could  have  been  checked  by  various  fiscal
and  monetary3A  policy  measures.
1/  This  may be strengthened  by the  Obstfeld-Calvo  substitution  effect. There
are  also  other  influences.  For  example  in the  Frondizi  stabilization  the
government  made  efforts  to  encouragE  direct  foreign  and  domestic  investment.
Similar  motivations  may  have  affected  other  stabilizations.
2/  The  tendency  for  a  reversal  in  GDP growth  helps  to  reduce  the  current
account  deficit  but  this  can  be  more  than  offset  by the  effect  of an
increased  probability  of  a  near  maxi  devaluation  on  the  imports  of  durable
goods  and Inventories.
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The fact  that  this  course  was  not  taken  reflects  the  inability  to
sustain  the  initial  contractionary  efforts  which  characterized  all
stabilization  attempts. The  failure  of the  programs  can  therefore  be
attributed  to the  inability  to sustain  the  contractionary  efforts  both  in the
fiscal  and  financial  areas.
Another  implication  of this  analysis  is that  the  design  of the
program  --  heterodox  or orthodoz  --  is  not  very  important  as long  as the
fiscal  side  is  not  handled  properly. Proper  fiscal  control  is thus  a
necessary  condition  for  the  sustainability  of  any type  of stabilization.  In
addition,  given  the  long  history  of failures  and the  recurrent  cycles,  any  new
stabilization  attempts  should  start  by a fiscal  adjustment  much  more severe
than  would  otherwise  be necessary  (this  is the  principle  of overadjustment).
Finally,  we should  note that  the  debt  problem  and  the  resulting
continuous  current  account  deficit  add  another  dimension  to stabilization  in
the  1980s. Because  of this  precarious  situation  the  expectation  of
devaluations  undermine  any  stabilization  effort. Any  serious  attempt  requires
a consistent  strategy  to finance  the  service  of external  debt.  We have  noted
already  that  external  balance  is  essential  for  domestic  stabilization.
c.  The  Chilean  Experiment
The  Chilean  experiment,  using  the  exchange-rate-based-stabilization
differs  radically  from  the  Argentinian  one  with  respect  to  the  role  of fiscal
policy. Here  the  use  of the  exchange  rate  as a stabilizing  instrument  began
in  mid 1976  [according  to  Ramos  (1986)]  first  in  the  form  of some  discrete
revaluations,  then  in a tablita  announcing  the  future  rate  of devaluation  and
eventually,  in  mid 1979,  in the  form  of  a fixed  exchange  rate. This policy
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It is seen  clearly  in Table  7a  that  this  policy  was  accompanied  by a
systematic  fiscal  support,  with the  originally  small  public  sector  deficit
turning  gradually  into  a surplus  in 1979-81. Thus,  the  eventual  failure  to
maintain  exchange  rate stabilization  cannot  be explained  by the  standard
fiscal  argument  along  the  lines  of the  Krugman  (1979)  model. We shall
therefore  look  for  alternative  explanations.
While  quarterly  data  show  that  the  policy  was  eventually  successful
in bringing  down  inflation  to international  levels  (see  figure  5) it  is
noteworthy  that  this  took  five  years,  with  the  decisive  period  (of  pegging  the
exchange  rate)  lasting  two  years. Thus,  under  the  ezchange  rate stabilization
strategy  in  Chile  inflation  exhibited  the  sam  kind  of stubbornness  as in the
fiscal-monetary  phase.
The  asynchronization  between  inflation  and  devaluation  over  the
adjustment  period  led  to  a real  appreciation  of  over  30Z  with respect  to 1975
and  20X  with  respect  to 1976. Comparing  1981  with 1983,  after  the  policy  was
abandoned,  we obtain  again  an estimate  of overvaluation  of around  202.1/
During  the  adjustment  period  the  external  position  deteriorated  significantly,
causing  a reversal  of the  policy  accompanied  by  a severe  crisis  which  resulted
in  an  astounding  drop  of 15.7Z  in  real  CGP  in 1982  [see  Edwards  (1987)  and
Ramos  (1986)  for  a complete  account].
One  of the  explanations  offered  for  the  sluggish  reaction  of
domestic  prices  to  exchange  rate  stabilization  in  Chile  was the  existence  of
backward  looking  wage indexation  [Dornbusch  (1985)  and  Edwards  (1987)1. It is
1/  This  casts  some  doubt  on the  argument  that  the  appreciation  of the
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easy  to explain  by  mens  of this  model  how  the  lagged  convergence  of domestic
price  inflation  to the  rate  of devaluation  leads  in the  process  to  an
overvaluation  of the  level  of the  real  exchange  rate.l/
It must  be stressed,  however,  that  this  does  not explain  why  the
classical  mechanism  for  external  adjustment  under  a fixed  exchange  rate  regime
failed  to restore  full  equilibrium.  In  particular,  according  to the  monetary
approach  to the  balance  of payments  a  current  account  deficit  should  reduce
domestic  financial  assets  which  would  in  turn  reduce  domestic  prices  and  thus
restore  the  external  equilibrium.  It seems  therefore  that  the  Dornbusch-
Edwards  approach  is  based  implicitly  on the  assumption  of  a downward  rigidity
in prices.
In the  latter  case  the  real  exchange  rate  cannot  adjust,  and  the
remaining  mechanism  is through  a recession  along  Keynesian  lines. However,
since  this  solution  is  not satisfactory,  a devaluation  must  come  sooner  or
later. In this interpretation  price  rigidity  appears  as a basic  element  in
the  explanation  of the  need  to abandon  the  fixed  exchange  rate  policy.
An alternative  explanation  to the  sluggishness  of inflation  in  Chile
is  associated  with  the  liberalization  of the  capital  markets  which  was  part  of
the  stabilization  policies  in  the  Southern  Cone. According  to this  view,  the
opening  of capital  markets  to  foreign  inflows  constituted  an  exogenous
stimulus  to investment  which  led  to  a domestic  boom.  This  exerted  a pressure
on domestic  prices  which  slowed  down their  convergence  to the  rate  of
devaluation  [Corbo  (1983)  and  Edwards  (1987)].
1/  We  may  note,  however,  that  the  above  developments  will  also  occur  in a
non-indexed  economy  where  nominal  wages  are  determined  in  a setting  of
staggered  contracts  of the  Taylor  type. The  specific  contribution  of
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However  why  should  this  cause  an  overvaluation  of the  currency?
Edwards  suggests  that  the  reason  is  due  to the  fact  that  the  flow  of foreign
investment  takes  place  at a  diminishing  rate  (as  in stock  adjustment
models). Therefore  the  initial  increase  in  domestic  prices  represents  an
overshooting.  This  leaves,  however,  the  question  of why  do not  domestic
prices  adjust  to the  declining  rate  of foreign  investment?  Again  the  answer
must  rely  on the  downward  rigidity  of domestic  prices.
It should  be noted  that  in  principle,  as in  the  Argentinian  case,
part  of the  capital  inflows  themselves  can  be explained  endogenously  in terms
of inflationary  inertia. The interaction  of the  latter  with  the  reduced  rate
of devaluation  creates  in the  early  stage  an interest  differential  which
stimulates  capital  inflows. The  reduced  cost  of borrowing  abroad  can  explain
part  of the  domestic  boom  which  followed  exchange  rate  stabilization.  With
perfect  capital  mobility  the  foregoing  conditions  will  produce  a reduction  in
the  real  interest  rate  which  will  stimulate  domestic  activity,  as explained
earlier.
Edwards  (1987)  seems  to rule  out  this  kind  of explanation-because
the  Chilean  government  did  not  permit  short  term  capital  inflows. However,
the  question  is  whether  these  controls  were  sufficiently  strong  in view  of the
considerable  excess  of  domestic  interest  rate  over  Libor  plus  devaluation.l/
The  role  of inflationary  rigidity  in the  exchange  rate  based
stabilization  comes  out  even  clearer  in  the  case  of the  parallel  Uruguayan
stabilization  because  in this  case  the  capital  market  was  opened  for  short-
term  capital  flows  from  the  start  of the  programs  [Ramos  (1986)]. In  Uruguay
1/  On this  differential  see  Ramos,  op.  cit.  Table  8.12  and  Edwards,  op.  cit.
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the  phase  of exchange  rate  based  stabilization  took  place  from  the  end  of 1978
to the  end  of 1982  and  was supported  throughout  the  first  three  years  by a
balanced  budget  as can  be seen  in  Table  7c (in  the  fourth  year the  increase  in
the  fiscal  deficit  reflects  to a large  extent  the  effect  of the  recession).
However,  even  after  three  years  of  exchange  rate  stabilization  (in
the  tablita  fashion)  inflation  did  not  fully  converge.l/  The  data in  Table  4c
suggest  that  the  overvaluation  in this  period  amounted  to some  30%  which  is of
a similar  order  of magnitude  as in  Chile. These  developments  are  particularly
interesting  in  view  of the  fact  that  Uruguay  did  not  have  official  wage
indexation  (although  social  security  payments  were indexed). It seems
therefore  that  the  sluggish  price  adjustment  must  be explained  by other
factors.
One  of the  explanatory  factorsX was  the  economic  expansion  of 1979-
80  which  was  stimulated  by the  capital  inflows  induced  by the  spread  between
domestic  and  foreign  interest  rates  (after  taking  account  of the  announced
depreciation).  This  spread  itself  is,  however,  related  to  the  initial
sluggishness  in  the  adjustment  of  domestic  prices. Thus  economic  expansion
and inflationary  rigidities  reinforce  each  other  in  the  early  stage  of
exchange  rate  stabilization.
The examination  of the  Uruguay  case  tends  to strengthen  the
impression  that  the  continued  overvaluation  of the  exchange  rate,  which  led  to
the  crises  of the  early  1980s,  cannot  be fully  explained  by wage  indexation,
1/  This  experiment  is  not  independent  of the  Argentinian  one.  In particular
the  reversal  of the  stabilization  policy  in  Argentina  in 1981  affected  the
price  convergence  in  Uruguay.
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by exogenous  capital  inflows  or by current  fiscal  deficits. In the  next
section  we try  to  look  for  an additional  explanation  in terms  of credibility
in the  process  of price  adjustment.
5.  Inertia,  Credibility  and  Exchange  Rate  Policy
Problems  of inertia  and  lack  of credibility,  resulting  in
inflationary  rigidities,  seem  to have  played  a significant  role  in orthodox
disinflationary  policies  based  on exchange  rate  stabilization.  Some  aspects
of this  problem  can  be  analyzed  within  a simple  theoretical  framework  which
can  also  point  to  possible  policy  solutions.  The  basic  ideas  can  be described
by a simple  diagram,  leaving  the  formal  analysis  to  Appendix  A.
Suppose  that  in the  original  situation  the  economy  is at the  point  A
in  Figure  6  where  the  rate  of devaluation  is  cE  which  equals  also  the  rate  of
inflation  of non-tradeables  (W). At this  point  the  economy  and the  real
ezchange  rate  e are  at their  long  run  equilibrium.  Suppose  now that  the  rate
of devaluation  is  lowered  to el,  with B  as the  new  long  run  equilibrium.
If  i adjusts  in  a sluggish  manner  because  of inertia  then  the  real
exchange  rate  will  appreciate  and  the  economy  will  move  along  AC.  The  economy
will run  initially  into  a current  account  deficit  but,  in principle,  can
converge  to the  point  B  where  full  equilibrium  is  restored  with inflation  down
1/ to eIc-  Thus the  existence  of inertia  does  not  preclude  the  possibility  of
convergence. [This  is  basically  the  idea  in the  analysis  of Rodriguez
(1982)1.
It should  be noted,  however,  that  convergence  requires  that  beyond
the  point  C v  should  overshoot  its  long  run  equilibrium  in  the  downward
direction  (i.e.  w <  el). If  we take  el ,  0, as in the  Chilean  stabilization,
1I The  foregoing  analysis  assumes  equality  between  actual  and  expected  values  of
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then  it  means  that  the  economy  has  to  go through  a period  of actual  price
deflation. However,  in  an economy  with  an inflationary  background,  it is
quite  likely  that  people  will  not  believe  that  disinflation  may  go that  far.
In a  model  of rational  expectations  this  lack  of  credibility  cannot
be resolved  within  the  foregoing  framework. Thus,  the  economy  may  get stuck
at C with  a continuing  overvaluation  relative  to the  full  equilibrium  level.
The  expectations  of an impending  maxi-devaluation  may then  cause  a balance  of
payments  crisis.
Are  there  any  alternative  policies  which  may  prevent  the  foregoing
development?  One  way is to  proceed  in  a two  stage  policy. In  the  first  stage
the  rate  of devaluation  remains  at e0,  while  the  government  implements  fiscal
measures. With  appropriate  measures  of this  nature  z  will  come  down  causing
an initial  real  depreciation  moving  the  economy  along  AG.  After  building  up a
sufficient  "reserve"  in terms  of  an  undervalued  exchange  rate  the  government
may  reduce  e  to eI=  0 and  let  the  economy  converge  to  B along  GB.
It is interesting  to  note  that  in  all  three  exchange-rate-based
stabilizations  in  the  Southern  Cone  in the  1970s  the  governments  tried
initially  to raise  the  real  exchange  rate  and improve  the  external  position  by
means  of a  monetary-fiscal  package  (Ramos  [1986]). Thus,  they  were following
implicitly  the  foregoing  strategy. However,  the  initial  adjustment  never  went
far  enough  to  make  the  convergence  possible.
An alternative  possibility  is to  set  a less  ambitious  goal for
disinflation.'/  In this  case  convergence  may  be possible  even  without  fiscal
overadjustment,  but  the  achievement  may  also  be small. It is  also  possible  to
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consider  an  appropriate  mix of fiscal  overadjustment  and  of the  desired
reduction  in the  rate  of devaluation. If the  fiscal  balance  is  maintained  in
the  long  run  then  credibility  may  be restored  and  convergence  to  full
stabilization  may  become  possible. This  might  be a long  road  but  perhaps  the
only feasible  one  under  orthodox  stabilization,  since  in practice  the
continued  adherence  to  a fix  exchange  did  not  prove  to  be feasible  in  the
stabilization  under  review.
IV.  Concluding  Remarks
So far  we have  discussed  causes  for  failure  of stabilization  in
chronic  inflation  countries. In there  any  case  of  a success  in  this  area  from
which  we may  draw  some  positive  conclusions  for  stabilization  in  the  orthodox
way?
It seems  that  the  only  example  which  we can  use  from  the  past
fifteen  years  is  Chile. In spite  of the  failures  of individual  programs  and
the  severe  errors  committed  in  their  course  [on  this  see  Edwards,  Ramos  and
Foxley,  op.  cit.)  it  must  be pointed  out that  chile  was  consistent  in its
fiscal  and  nominal  policies.
First  we may  note  that  fiscal  discipline  has  been  maintained  up to
this  date  --  with  the  deficit  rising  temporarily  only in  connection  with the
1982  recession. Similarly  nominal  anchors  were  upheld  consistently.  We may
note  that  in 1982  formal  wage  indexation  was  abolished  --  signaling  a policy
of non-accommodation.  We must  also  point  out  that  Chile  was  much  more
restrained  compared  with  Argentina  in its  monetary  policies  following  the
financial  crisis  of the  early  1980s.NL-2/2-1-88  - 61 -
It seems  that  as a result  of the  persistence  of these  policies  Chile
managed  to  overcome  the  symptoms  of  a chronic  inflation  country. This  can  be
inferred  not  merely  from  the  current  low  level  of inflation  (less  than  15%  per
year)  but  mainly  by the  speed  in  which  it  stabilized  inflation  after  the  big
devaluation  of 1982.
The  reaction  to a balance  of payments  crisis  has  always  been  a most
effective  test  for  the state  of chronic  inflation  illness. As  we have pointed
out,  it is quite  often  the  case  that  the  foregoing  crises  raise  the  inflation
plateau. We have seen  this  happen  in  the  case  of Brazil  and  Mexico  in  the
1980s. However,  the  reaction  of Chile  to  a similar  crisis  is quite  different,
with  inflation  remaining  low  in spite  of sharp  devaluations  (Figure  5)
The  first  lesson  which  we  may  draw  from  the  Chilean  success  is  that
curing  a chronic  inflation  by  orthodox  methods  can  be successful  but  the
treatment  may  take  a decade  or even  more.  During  this  period  fiscal  and
nominal  discipline  must be  maintained  persistently.  It is the  persistence
rather  than  the  specific  policies  (tyFes  of exchange  rate  or wage  policies)
which  is the  key  to the  success.
The  main  drawbacks  of this  success  are  the  low  average  growth  rate
and  the  severe  crises  which  shook  the  Chilean  economy  along  the  way.  This
raises  the  question  of  whether  the  heterodox  policies  can  offer  some  better
alternative.
A basic  feature  of the  latter  approach  is that  in  addition  to  the
fiscal-exchange-rate  package  it  uses  temporary  wage-price  controls  to  prevent
a major  difficulty  of orthodox  programs  - namely  the  overvaluation  which
results  from  sluggish  adjustment  of  domestic  prices. However,  can  the
controls  overcome  the  sources  of the  sluggishness?NL-2/2-1-88  - 62  -
One source  of sluggishness  --  that  of lagged  effects  of wage
indexation  can  certainly  be removed  by  a temporary  wage-price  freeze. The
problem  of staggered  prices  and  wages,  as a  source  of inertia  is  more
difficult  to solve.  Nonetheless  something  can  be done  in this  area  by creating
an initial  slack  in the  economy. The  excess  supply  may  enable  a realignment
of prices  without  causing  much  inflationary  pressure.
However  the  most important  role  of the  incomes  policies  is to
provide  sufficient  time  for  the  government  to  convince  the  private  sector  that
the  cut  in the  budget  deficit  is  sustainable. In  orthodox  policies  lack  of
credibility  related  to the  fiscal  cut  creates  sluggish  price  adjustment  which
leads  to  overvaluation  and  external-sector  difficulties.  (This  happens  even
if  the  government's  announcement  with  respect  to fiscal  policy  are  genuine.)
Income  policies  may  prevent  this  development  and  thus  enable  price
stabilization  without  much strain  from  overvaluation.  However,  in  order  to be
able  to use  controls  effectively  some  degree  of slack  has  to  be created  in the
economy  (Blejer  and  Liviatan,  op.  cit.).
The foregoing  discussion  suggests  that  the  success  of heterodox
policies  requires  contractionary  measures,  just  as any  other  stabilization.
It is  an empirical  question  whether  these  measures  can  cut  the  social  cost  of
adjustment. Since  there  is  no decisive  case  of a successful  heterodox
stabilization  it is  hard  to  answer  this  question. However,  the  current
success  of the  Israeli  stabilization  policies  provide  some  hope  in this
direction.- 63  -
Table  1
Bolivia  Annual  Indicators
Budget  Inflation  GDP  Unemployment  Terms
Deficit  Seigniorage  Rates  Growth  Rate  of
(as  x  GNP)  (as  %  GDP)  (Averages)  Trade
1980  9.0  3.2  47.2  1.2  5.8  100.0
1981  7.8  1.6  28.6  -0.4  9.7  99.7
1982  14.7  12.2  133.3  -5.6  10.9  98.1
1983  19.1  10.0  269.0  -7.2  13.0  99.3
1984  27.4  15.9  1,281.4  -2.4  15.5  104.1
1985  9.1  8.8  11,749.6  -4.0  18.0  104.3
1986*  2.9  n.a.  276.3  -2.9  20.0  81.9
Source: IFS  for  Inflation  and  Seigniorage,  Morales  (1987b)  for  other
variables.
*  Preliminary  Figures_64  -
Table  2 (Bolivia)
Week-to-Week  Percent  Changes  in  Prices  and  Free  Market  Exchange  Rates
CPI  Exchange  Rate
August 5  - August  11  18.37  4.91
August  11  - August  18  8.57  2.42
August  19  - August  25  6.15  9.26
August  26  - September  1  19.87  12.31
September 2 - September 8  36.82  -12.96
September 9 - September  15  -4.60  -9.78
September  16  - September  22  -0.84  -3.15
September  23 - September  29  -2.51  8.09
September  30  - October  6  0.74  1.87
Source: Morales  (1987a)- 65  -
Table  3
Bolivia  Monthl Rate  of Growth
(Percentages)
Consumer  Free  Market  Moneta  y
Price  Indexl/  Exchange  Rate-  B-se
September  1984  37.33  94.44  15.12
October  59.13  11.11  27.14
November  31.56  21.47  25.52
December  60.88  32.74  124.22
January  1985  68.76  197.84  36.63
February  182.77  93.25  39.50
March  24.94  -9.19  42.51
April  11.78  30.66  43.50
May  35.67  62.68  64.93
June  78.46  76.87  32.83
July  66.30  83.80  57.72
August  66.46  33.52  69.85
Beginning  of Stabilization  Program
September  56.51  -8.02  46.07
October  -1.86  3.01  15.04
November  3.20  22.01  -. 36
December  16.80  25.55  48.39
January  1986  32.96  30.56  -10.35
February  7.95  -14.43  11.67
March  .07  2.39  4.13
April  3.59  -1.76  8.57
May  .97  1.88  10.53
June  4.26  -.90  2.93
July  1.76  -.69  6.91
August  .66  .06  -.07
September  2.28  -.52  9.06
October  .58  .57  9.19
November  -.11  .14  10.36
December  .65  6.1  8.25
Source: Morales  (1987.b)
/a Month  to  month  changes  of  monthly  average  levels.
/b  End  of  month  to  end  of  month  changes.8 We
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Inflation  Se4gniorage  Inflation  Seigniorage  Inflati4n  SeIivlorwe
(CPI) x  (X  GDP)  (CPI) X  (X  GDP)  (CPI) X  (X GDP)
1979  53  3.3  160  5.9  20  1.1
1980  83  2.0  101  4.8  47  3.2
1981  106  2.0  105  3.5  29  1.6
1982  98  2.1  165  7.8  133  12.2
1983  142  2.0  344  8.6  269  10.0
1984  197  2.7  627  7.1  1281  15.9
1985  227  2.7  672  6.5  j  11710  8.8
Inflation:  Af38  averps.  (IFS)
Seigtorge:  Cailaated  as chma  da-tg  th  year of  ase mney divided by rnidnal  GP.  Fbr Artina
w  used M 1 instead  of  baae money  s1no  this  better  the  conapt  of sei&iorge
net  of interest  paid  bazics' reservs.- 68  -
Table 6a  H=X[O
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986
1.  Grath  rates  (2)
GDP  per  capita  al  5.4  5.1  -3.1  -7.6  0.8  -0.1  -1.4
Cbnuaptton  per  capita  a/  4.9  4.8  -1.4  -9.1  0.2  -0.8  -7.7
GDP  deflator  29  27  61  92  62  54  78
Nbinual devaluation  b/  -4  -1  114  96  25  40  143
Peal  VW6u8trial  mes  -4.4  1.2  1.9  -26.0  2.9  1.8  -19.2
Inports  (teal)  31.9  20.3  -37.0  -41.7  19.8  11.8  -18.0
2.  PexstE
CperaticmaJ.  Deficit/GDP  5.2  10.0  6.5  2.4  2.1  2.1  2.7
Printry  Deficit/GOP  n/a  9.4  5.1  -5.1  -5.0  -3.3  n/a
3.  1n4
R  effOctie  exchanz  rate  100  91  134  138  114  113  152
4.  Cbrret  Amoout (bil.  US$)  -8.1  -13.8  -6.2  5.4  4.1  1.2  -1.3
Source:  Wbrld  Bakd
al  At cmtat  prices.
b/  Effectri  exdiange rate.
Tahie 6b  BRAZIL
1982  1983  1984  1985
1.  Omth  rates  (2)
GM a/  0.9  -2.5  5.7  8.3
Cosumptin  a/  3.0  -3.0  2.8  7.1
Iports  (const.  prices)  -6.0  -17.4  -2.9  _
GOP  defilator  93  152  211  235
Nmlnal  dewahaticn  b/  93  221  220  235
Ral  industrial  wages  cJ  7.5  -8.6  -1.4  6.3
2.  PmEmm
C 9 'deficit/GDP  8.3  4.8  2.7  4.3
3.  Imbde
Real effertive  ehanWe  100  123  123  128
rate
4.  Cirrent  account (biL  US$)  -16.3  -6.8  - -0.2
Souce:  BW
a/  At constant  prioes.
b/  Agalnst $,  maa-l  awerags.
C/  In Sao  Palo.BASIC  ?f  , w  hIC  %ITA~
Isble  7a  romn
1911-1983
Indicator  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983
Per capita  GNP  7.1  -2.9  -7.1  -0.7  -14.4  1.8  8.0  6.4  6.5  6.0  3.9  -15.7  -2.4
g  rate
kaalqgoymmnt  rate  5.7  3.7  4.6  9.2  16.8  19.4  18.6  17.9  17.7  17.4  15.6  28.2  24.5
Inflatimn  rate  b/  26.7  108.3  441.0  497.8  379.2  232.8  113.8  50.0  33.4  35.1  19.7  9.9  27.3
Nominal  devaluation  455.0  649.5  490.3  165.8  64.9  47.0  17.7  4.7  0.0  30.5  54.9
Mh/GNP  17.0  .7.5  12.9  6.4  7.1  7.6  10.5  12.5  14.6  16.2  19.6  31.9  27.3
Pllicoectoz-  -10.7  -13.0  -24.7  -10.5  -2.6  -2.3  -1.8  -0.8  1.7  3.1  1.7  -2.3  -3.8
Current acommt-  -17.8  -48.1  -19.7  12.9  -27.1  5.4  -21.8  -37.8  -26.1  -33.9  -88.4  -48.6  -26.6
alw  w  loblex  119.3  108.2  80.0a/  64.8  62.1  63.0  71.1  75.7  82.0  89.4  97.5  97.1  86.8
Fal  effective  91.9  96.4  107.2  93.5  100.2  87.1  84.4  97.7  87.4  75.1  67.4  78.9  83.5
e1InEe  rate  c/
Thrss of trade  80.6  75.5  84.7  88.3  55.4  59.3  54.1  48.6  54.7  51.6  44.6  39.8  40.7
B.sad on Rbmos  (1986).
a/  Jamnry-h43st.
b/  Vard&iatis In the  CPI.
c/  Ecdhazp  rate  vwrlAtlims deflated  by the differen  betwemn  eoternal  and iternul  W?I.Table 7b AEaIEIJ&
indlcator  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983
Per capltal GN  2.0  0.1  1.8  4.4  -2.5  -2.1  4.7  -5.0  5.4  -0.5  -7.4  -6.8  1.2
h  rate
UTA.qdymLt  rate  6.0  6.6  5.3  3.4  2.6  4.5  2.8  2.8  2.0  2.3  4.5  4.8  4.0
Tnflat1in  rate  al  34.9  58.9  61.2  23.3  182.5  443.2  176.1  175.5  159.5  100.8  104.5  164.8  343.8
Ntidnal devaluatkm  14.6  -5.3  311.2  282.5  191.1  95.2  65.5  39.5  175.0  360.3  350.2
MG/P  26.3  24.5  29.6  36.7  28.9  24.1  31.5  33.9  36.0  34.0  34.1  28.8  26.3
Public  r
amzplunG/Q  -3.1  -3.3  -4.7  -5.3  -10.3  -7.2  -2.8  -3.2  -2.7  -3.6  -8.1  -7.2  -11.0
Obirruit-e>  t-  -18.4  -9.7  18.9  2.6  -36.8  14.3  17.1  24.5  -5.8  -48.3  -43.4  -27.5  -27.4
Pa1  wi  index  103.4  98.3  104.4  117.9  111.1  74.7  73.6  72.3  83.0  92.8  83.0  74.1  90.8
Pal  effective  94.9  107.3  102.7  87.8  134.2  88.5  114.0  102.9  77.2  69.2  87.0  112.9  104.1
ew±  /~erateW
Ibr  of trade  108.1  117.3  141.8  128.7  97.1  93.1  88.9  89.9  97.6  110.3  100.2  89.1  86.8
Ebad on R  s  (1986)
a/  aW  o  CPI.
/  lwe  rate  dwlaetk.u  dfled  by the diffenoe  betbm  eter1  a  IrAeiul  IPI.TIble  7c  IURN=Y
Indicator  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1960  1981  1982  1983
ir  caxi±ta  GNP  -0.2  -1.6  0.3  3.1  5.6  3.5  0.7  4.6  5.5  5.1  1.2  -10.3  -5.3
pakh  rate
U%A.loymet rate  7.6  7.7  8.9  8.1  12.7  11.8  10.1  8.3  7.4  6.6  11.9  15.5
Inflation  rate  a/  24.0  76.4  97.0  77.2  81.4  50.7  58.2  44.5  66.8  63.5  34.1  19.0  51.5
Nbimn  dnvl atla  55.4  39.0  89.1  47.7  39.9  28.9  29.3  15.7  18.7  36.2  148.3
II2IQIP  26.8  25.5  21.3  20.0  21.1  26.7  31.1  38.3  39.3  39.8  43.6  NWA  47.5
EIbblic-sector-  -5.8  -2.5  -1.2  -3.8  -4.3  -2.1  -1.3  -0.9  0.0  -0.3  -1.5  -9.1  -3.9
awpuWQNP
Ozrzut-r8accomt-  -28.7  13.5  4.4  -27.3  -35.9  -11.8  -21.2  -14.5  -30.4  -46.9  -27.5  -15.3  -4.0
Tewag:s  '
hal  wo  index  105.2  87.2  85.7  85.0  77.5  75.6  69.9  66.9  64.8  65.1  69.9  69.7  55.3
hal  effectiye  92.0  113.7  97.3  93.8  108.0  115.0  114.1  111.2  94.0  90.5  86.7  100.3  123.8
ex  YW  rateW
ITons of  trade,  pods  102.2  109.9  139.8  106.4  80.4  78.6  84.7  89.1  9.6  94.5  89.1  87.5  78.5
and  ervlcs
Sbure:  WALv on the  bisls  of official  data;  gruth  rate  of M1  Internatimud  Mboetary  Fund, liSaab  loaxl  &Sttatlm,
AWist  1985, and  atJstfml  eintboin&  1982.
Note:  a/  Varlatimn In the  coniamr  price  Index.
b/  Ehae  rate  varlatiom deflated  by the dff  w  beter  the  internal  and  fternal bdla]e-price  index.
M2  - Ml pbs  savins  and timn deposits.
Infintlcn  and devwbiatim are  amu2h  mal.  avrnpss:  1970-100.  Year 1983 - PrelJbimnry flgwres.
Tabl]n basd  an J.  Ras  (1966), Jxe  oo  lI  the gwfm  Cbne  of  Itib.  JAckm.  1973-1983.v  /e
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DEFNAT  National  Government  Deficit,  %  of GDP  (1958-1961  from  CONADE)
Source  ot  Public  sector  deficits  data  (UEFTOT  and  DEFP)  is  de Pablo  and
Martinez  (1987).  Same source  for  DEFP  in  Figure  4.  Deficits  are
calculated  by  "above  the  line"  approach.- 75-
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APPENDIX  A
Exchange  Rate  Stabilization  and  Inflationary  Inertia
The  purpose  of this  section  is  to formulate  a model  which  may  help
to  understand  the  issues  of stabilizing  inflation  by means  of reducing  the
rate  of devaluation  in the  presence  of inflation&ry  inertia. While  this  model
uses  much  of the  framework  of  iddriguez  (1982)  it  differs  from  the  letter  in
two  respects.
First,  and this  is the  most  important  difference,  we assume  rational
expectation  rather  than  the  adaptive  ones  assumed  by Rodriquez  and secondly,
we introduce  domestic  credit  explicitly.  This  is part  of  a larger  model  which
includes  assets  as well.  However,  because  the  full  model  is  not  manageable  in
diagraummautic  terms  we shall  confine  the  dynamic  analysis  to a partial
presentation.
Using  similar  framework  to that  of Rodriguez  (1982)  and  applying
some  modifications  we can  obtain  the  following  model
(  )  (-)
1T  X  t (E-v)  +  (I-a)  (0-r)1  + Q  (e,  c  - wi  (A-1)
e  e (c  - w)  (A-2)
with  the  following  notation
w  - expected  and  actual  rate  of inflation  of  nontraded  goods
E  - expected  and  actual  rate  of  nominal  devaluation
u  - rate  of expansion  of domestic  credit  (reflecting  fiscal  deficits)
e  - real  exchange  rate  (e  - E where  K - nominal  exchange  rate  and  P -
price  of  nontraded  goods).NL-2/2-1-88  - 83  -
e  - long  term  equilibrium  real  exchange  rate
Q  - excess  demand  for  nontraded  goods
i  is the  time  derivative dt
A sign  (+)  or (-)  over  a variable  denote  the  sign  of its  partial.  X and  a
are  positive  parameters
(A-1)  says  that  inflationary  expectations (w)  are  adjusted
according  to three  indicators  --  the  rate  of devaluation,  the  rate  of money
injection  and  the  current  state  of excess  demand.
We assume  that  excess  demand  for  nontradeables  is  negatively  related
to the  real  rate  of interest,  which  under  perfect  capital  mobility  is  given  by
r  i  +  (c - w)  (1  - Y)  where  y  is  the  weight  of  tradeables  and  i*  is  the
foreign  interest  rate.  Since  i  and  y  are  constant,  the  real interest  rate
can  be represented  by E  - w  as in (A-1). It  may  be noted  that  v  is  treated  as
a stace  variable. E  is  treated  as  a policy  parameter.  (A-2)  is  an identity
when  w represents  actual  inflation  of nontraded  goods  prices.
In  a steady  state  we  have  c  =  =  -iv  and  Q  - 0.  The  latter
equalities  determine  the  long  term  equilibrium  value  of e,  which  is
independent  of the  nominal  parameters.
The  case  of balance  of payments  crisis  arises  when  e  is set  below
p.  This  is inconsistent  with  a steady  state  equilibrium  and  must lead  to
constant  loss  of reserves. Since  in  this  case  it is  obvious  that  the  policy
is  unsustainable  let  us assume  that  v  =  e so  that  the  exchange  rate  policy  is
supported  by the  budgetary  policy. If p  =  0 we have  a balanced  budget  which
is  essential  for  long  run  sustainability  if  e is  set  at zero.
The foregoing  system  is  potentially  stable. Given  the  signs  of the
partials  the  system  is stable  if  X  +  Q  r >  0, where Q  r  0.  When  this
condition  is satisfied,  a reduction  in e (possibly  to e  =  0) will  eventuallyNL-2/2-1-88  - 84  -
lead  to  a similar  reduction  in  w  (when  p  - e).  There  is  no need  for  any
balance  of payments  crisis  to  arise  since  in  the  long  run  m increases  and
therefore  central  bank's  reserves  will increase.
The  phase  diagram  is  given  by Figure  5,  where  it is seen  that  a
reduction  of c  from  eO to cI  will lead  to a convergent  motion  along  ACB (if
the  solution  is  not  oscillatory).
Let  eI  - 0,  and suppose  that  people  do not  believe  that  v  can
become  negative,  as is implied  by the  foregoing  convergence. If  expectations
are  rational  this  possibility  must  be excluded.
One  way of  dealing  with  this  c:onstraint  is  by assuming  that  any
trajectory  below  the  w  - 0 axis  is irrelevant.  On the  latter  axis itself  only
a  north-east  movement  is  relevant. The  motion  along  ACB  will  be stuck  at C.
At this  point  the  exchange  rate  is overvalued.  The system  can  be extricated
from  this  impasse  only  if  the  policy  is reversed  and  the  rate  of devaluation
is stepped  up.
Is it possible  at all  to  attain  the  point  B starting  from  A.?.  It
seems  that  a strategy  which  can  achieve  this  objective  is  a two  stage  policy
which  gtarts  with a reduction n p  holding  e constant  at c  . We can  then see
from  (A-1)  and  (A-2)  that  this  will  cause  a reduction  in  w  and  an increase  in
e, implying  a movement  along  AG in  Figure  5.
The reduction  in  j  may  be constructed  so  that  at  an appropriate  time
the  system  may  continue  on  a trajectory  that  converges  to B  with
e  - p  =  0.  This represents  the  second  stage  when  E  is  reduced  to  zero.
Thus,  in  order  to  converge  it is  necessary  to start  with an  overadjustment  of
the  budget  in the  sense  that  u  < e.Pollcy,  Planning,  and Reearh|
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on a tight fiscal stance - are very effective in  best slow. In some cases inflation picks up, and
stopping hypernflation,  as in Bolivia in 1985.  many such programs have to be abandoned
The hyperinflation eliminates wage and price  because they lack credibility.
inertia, and because it cannot go on for long it
makes a serious stabilization program credible.  In the long run, however, persistence and
discipline can make the orthodox approach
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stance with the exchange rate as the anchor.
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